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RETAIL PRICE MAINTENANCE FOR LIQUOR:
DOES THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT PRECLUDE
A FREE TRADE MARKET?

By Rosemary Hart*

Introduction
The constitutionality of California's minimum price laws for liquor, is
currently under review by the state supreme court. The much-criticized
program is being challenged by a San Francisco liquor store cited for selling
alcoholic beverages at prices below those set by law.2 The program requires
liquor distillers to file monthly retail price schedules for their products;
retailers who sell liquor below the listed prices are subject to sanctions
imposed at the discretion of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control. 3 The main thrust of this most recent challenge is that the
price scheme violates the Sherman Antitrust Act 4 and denies equal protection of the law; 5 in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Member, second-year class.
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 24749-24756 (West Supp. 1977) (amended 1972).
2. In a disciplinary order, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) suspended the liquor retailer's license. In proceedings to review the order,the ABC Appeals Board
reversed, holding that the retail price maintenance laws violated the state and federal equal
protection clauses. In re Corsetti, AB No. 4311 (Cal. Dec. 12, 1976) (Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Board). On writ of review, the state court of appeal annulled the Appeal
Board's order and affirmed the decision of the ABC to suspend the retailer's license in Rice v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 137 Cal. Rptr. 213, 221 (hearing granted, May 16,
1977). Once the state supreme court granted a hearing, the text of the appellate court's opinion
was withdrawn from the offical reports. See CAL. CT. R. 977. Thus, the text of that opinion
appears only in the pages of the unofficial report.
3. Violators are subject to sanctions imposed pursuant to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
24755.1 (West Supp. 1977). Sanctions include monetary penalties, suspension of a liquor license
or revocation of a license.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. § 1.
5. Liquor is the only item in California that is retailed at set minimum prices. The pricing
laws are challenged under both the state and federal constitutions as denying equal protection to
liquor consumers, who are the only California consumers who do not derive the price benefits
of a free market system. Another argument, and one not made by the petitioner, is that the
pricing scheme's classification of liquor retailers as the only retail sellers in the state who must
adhere to prices set by manufacturers constitutes a violation of equal protection.
The state constitution provides that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
*
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Board,6 the California Supreme Court will examine the extent to which
section two of the Twenty-first Amendment 7 shields the regulations from
these alleged violations.
The Sherman Act challenge raises a commerce clause issue. If
Congress has not enacted legislation in an area within its commerce clause
power, a state may ordinarily legislate in that area as long as it does not
result in an undue burden on the free flow of interstate commerce. 8 If,
however, the state regulation conflicts with federal legislation enacted
pursuant to the commerce power, the state statute must bow to the federal
law under the supremacy clause. 9 But when, as in Rice, the state law is a
liquor regulation enacted pursuant to the state's constitutional power under
the Twenty-first Amendment, the state law will not automatically be
preempted under the supremacy clause because the Twenty-first Amendment provides additional support for the state power to legislate. 10
The historical defense for California's liquor price laws is that the state
legislature could rationally have enacted the program in the belief that the
laws promote temperance11 and offer protection to the many "mom and
pop" liquor stores that would otherwise have to engage in open price
competition with volume retail outlets. 12 The California Supreme Court has
ruled on the constitutionality of the laws three times since 1959 and, on each
occasion, has upheld their validity under the state constitution. 13 In all three
operation." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11. "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted
which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or
class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be
granted to all citizens." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
6. 137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (hearing granted, May 16, 1977).
7. Section two declares that "[t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
8. See generally cases cited notes 220 & 222 infra.
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956);
Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954). See generally Note, Pre-Emption As A
PreferentialGround:A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. RE%,. 208 (1959).
10. In Part I, sections B and C of this note, the author discusses the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the extent of the states' power under the Twenty-first
Amendment.
11. Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d
349, 360-61, 420 P.2d 735, 743, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 31 (1966); Allied Properties v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 148, 346 P.2d 737, 740 (1959).
12. Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d
349, 362, 420 P.2d 735, 744, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 32 (1966).
13. Samson Mkt. Co. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 71 Cal. 2d 1215, 459
P.2d 667, 81 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1969); Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d 349, 420 P.2d 735, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1966); Allied Properties v.
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 346 P.2d 737 (1959).
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cases, however, the court's analysis was limited to the questions of whether
the laws constituted a proper exercise of the police power and a proper
delegation of legislative authority. In Rice, the court will examine federal
constitutional issues.
The California Court of Appeal held in Rice that because the liquor
price laws are part of a state regulatory scheme constituting state action,
they are not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, which pertains only to
actions by private individuals and corporations.1 4 The court also stated that
Congress did not intend to invalidate any statute affecting the price of liquor
as a result of its 1975 repeal of the state fair trade exemption. Even if
Congress did so intend, however, the court held that the state has broad
powers under section two of the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate liquor
traffic within its borders and that these regulations take precedence over
conflicting federal legislation, including the Sherman Act. 15 The equal
protection argument made by the liquor store owners was discussed only
briefly, as the court deferred to the prior decisions of the 16California Supreme
Court that had found the laws to have a rational basis.
The primary purpose of this note is to define a constitutional analysis
for determining the scope of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment, with a focus on the Sherman Act and equal protection guarantees as
grounds for abolishing California's retail price maintenance laws for liquor.
Although the Twenty-first Amendment grants the states wide power to
control the importation and transportation of liquor, the United States
Supreme Court has established that (1) commerce clause conflicts between
federal laws and state liquor regulations are to be resolved by an accommodation, or balancing, test, and (2) state liquor laws are, in any event, subject
14. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 217-218. The Sherman Act applies its restraints to "every person,"
which includes corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 7, (1976). Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
developed a common law exemption to the Sherman Act that is referred to as a "state action"

exemption. The ParkerCourt stated that action (1) established under authorization by the state,
(2) subject to state approval and (3) enforced with the state's penal sanctions was immune from
the Sherman Act's restrictions. Id. at 352. The "state action" antitrust exemption for certain
state regulatory schemes is not to be confused with the "state action" doctrine in Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection analysis, which limits the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments'

application to acts of the states and excludes purely private action from the coverage of those
amendments. The antitrust "state action" exemption is discussed at notes 154-203 and accompanying text infra.
15. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 219. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee recommending
repeal of the fair trade exemptions to the antitrust laws observed that "while repeal of the fair
trade laws generally will prohibit manufacturers from enforcing resale prices, alcohol manufac-

turers may do so in such States which pass price fixing statutes pursuant to the Twenty-first
Amendment." S. REP. No. 466, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1975). However, as Congress did
not expressly exempt the liquor industry from the 1975 repeals, California liquor price provi-

sions are still subject to the Sherman Act restrictions and would fall under the Act were it not
for the grant of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment. See generally notes 150-53 and

accompanying text infra.
16. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20.
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to equal protection requirements. The note will show that under the Supreme
Court's accommodation test, the California liquor price laws must yield to
the Sherman Antitrust Act. The equal protection argument made in Rice
provides another ground for eliminating the laws; examined under the newer
"fair and substantial relationship" standard recently employed by the
California Supreme Court, the liquor provisions appear to be an irrational
and out-dated method of achieving their stated goals.
After a brief examination of the legislative and judicial history of state
power to control liquor prior to enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment,
Part I of the note reviews the scope of state power under the Amendment.
The note traces the Amendment's scope as construed by the United States
Supreme Court, from the Court's initial grant of broad and comprehensive
state power over importation of liquor to the current approach, which
recognizes various constitutional limitations on state liquor laws. Part II of
the note examines the limitations imposed on the scope of state power under
the Amendment by the commerce and equal protection clauses. The discussion commences with an examination of the conflict between the state's
liquor laws and the Sherman Act's policy against resale price maintenance.
After establishing that the common law "state action" exemption should
not have been employed by the California Court of Appeal to immunize the
liquor laws from Sherman Act restraints, the note defines the criteria for the
Twenty-first Amendment accommodation test and applies the test to the
California liquor laws. Finally, the note surveys developments in both
federal and California equal protection analysis and examines the liquor
price laws under the California Supreme Court's most recent standard of
review for provisions that no longer seem rational.
I.

The Scope of State Power Under the Twenty-first Amendment

The Twenty-first Amendment originated out of a long statutory and
constitutional struggle between two conflicting interests: (1) the dry states'
interest in preventing the importation of intoxicating liquors 17 and (2) the
federal government's authority to promote and protect interstate
commerce. 18 Section one of the Amendment simply ended Prohibition, but
section two granted the states additional power to regulate alcoholic beverages:
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited. '9
17. "Dry state" refers to a state that completely prohibits the manufacture, sale or use of
intoxicating liquors or allows such activities only for tightly controlled uses, such as for
medicinal or religious purposes.

18. The commerce clause gives Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States ....

" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

19. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2. On December 5, 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment
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Questions involving the Twenty-first Amendment have been decided
on a case by case basis to date; the Supreme Court has not interpreted the
effect of section two on all other parts of the Constitution. Nevertheless,
definite trends have emerged in the Court's treatment of the effect of the
commerce and equal protection clauses on the Amendment. This part of
the note examines the development of state power under section two,
focusing on the commerce clause and equal protection limitations. The first
section discusses the Amendment's legislative history which, it is suggestto
ed, supports the theory that the initial purpose of section two was
20
intoxicants.
of
importation
the
bar
to
states'authority
establish the dry
A. State Regulation of Liquor Prior to the Amendment
Prior to adoption of the Amendment, the Supreme Court had established that a state could completely prohibit the manufacture and use of
liquor within its boundaries. 21 The Court also held, however, that the
if
commerce clause restrained the states from prohibiting the sale of liquor 22
the imported intoxicants arrived in their original, unopened packages.
Responding to the Court's decision, Congress enacted the Wilson Act 2 3 in
1890, proclaiming that imported liquor was subject to a state's police power
upon arrival within that state's boundaries. Shortly after the Wilson Act was
adopted, the Supreme Court began to establish a loophole to the legislative
provision. 24 In successive cases, the Court declared that once an intoxicating
liquor arrived within a state's borders, that state could prevent intrastate sale
of the liquor3 5 "Arrival" in a state was interpreted to take place, however,
upon "delivery to the consignee." 26 Thus, the prohibition on liquor sales
was declared, in a proclamation by the Secretary of State, to have been ratified by three-fourths
of the states in the United States and certified as valid as a part of the Constitution. U.S.C.A.,
CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENTS 14 TO END 575 (1961) (legislative history note).
20. See Note, The Twenty-first Amendment Versus the Interstate Commerce Clause, 55
YALE L.J. 815, 818 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 55 YALE L.J.]; 7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 402 (1939).
But see Kallenback, Interstate Commerce in Intoxicating Liquors Under the Twenty-first
Amendment, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 474 (1938).
21. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 505

(1847).
22. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890): "[I]nasmuch as interstate commerce

. . .

is

national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so long as Congress does

not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the States so to do, it thereby indicates its will that
such commerce shall be free and untrammelled." Id. at 109-10. Accord, Bowman v. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
23. Ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (currently codified in 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1970)). Generally, it
provided that all intoxicating liquors transported into any state and remaining there for use,

consumption or sale were subject to regulation through the police powers of that state. Further,
intoxicants were subject to state regulation upon arrival in the state even if the alcohol arrived

in its original package.
24. See Dowling & Hubbard, Divesting an Article of Its Interstate Character,5 MINN. L.
REV. 100, 105-06 (1921).

25. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
26. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 426 (1898). Accord, Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co.

(No. 1), 170 U.S. 438 (1898).
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would not take effect until after the alcohol had already been delivered to its
purchaser. The practical effect of this judicial interpretation was that mail
order businesses dealing in liquor could frustrate state prohibition because
neither manufacture nor sale of an alcoholic beverage would technically
occur within the state.
Congress recognized the need to protect the dry states from mail order
liquor operations. During Congressional debates on a bill to rectify the
situation, Senator Kenyon observed that it "is evident that under such
circumstances the prohibition law of a State is practically nullified, and
intoxicating liquors are imposed upon its people against the will of the
majority. "27 To block the judicial loophole, Senators Webb and Kenyon
sponsored a bill that Congress adopted in 1913. The Webb-Kenyon Act
generally prohibited shipment or transportation of intoxicating liquors into a
state for any use "in any manner or by any means whatsoever" in violation
of any law of that state.2 8 The initial judicial interpretation 9 of the Act held
that the law divested intoxicating liquors of their interstate character, there30
by withdrawing commerce clause restraints on interstate liquor shipments.
The next major controversy concerning commerce in interstate liquor
arose in the early 1930's, when Congress began drafting an amendment to
end national prohibition. 3 1 When Congressional debate began on what was
later to become the Twenty-first Amendment, the controversy focused on
whether to incorporate the protection granted by the Webb-Kenyon Act. An
examination of these debates shows that the purpose of section two of the
Amendment was to guarantee the protection of the Webb-Kenyon Act as a
matter of federal constitutional law. The general thrust of the debates
reflected a concern to "assure the so-called dry States protection against the
importation of intoxicating liquor into those states.'"32 During the course of
his oration, Senator Borah expressed concern that judicial interpretations of
the Webb-Kenyon Act could once again render the states "powerless to
27. 49 CONG. REC. 761 (1912) (remarks of Sen. Kenyon).

28. Ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (amended 1935) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1970)).
29. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
30. Later cases gave no hint of a blanket power to regulate imported liquor within the
state. The cases interpreting the Act concerned situations in which the state had enacted a
prohibition against liquor or allowed importation only for specified, restricted purposes. For
example, Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. North Carolina, 245 U.S. 298 (1917), construed the Webb-

Kenyon Act as extending state power to cover regulations concerning the importation of liquor,
which, by state statute, was allowed only for medicinal uses.
31. The procedure necessary to amend the Constitution is described in U.S. CONsT. art.

V.
Prohibition in the United States resulted from the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors. U.S. CONST. amend.
XVIII (repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (1933)). The Secretary of State proclaimed
the Amendment ratified on January 29, 1919. U.S.C.A., CoNsrrm-rrIoN, AMENDMENTS 14 TO

ENrD 547 (1961) (legislative history note).
32. 76 CoNG. REc. 4139-41, 4141 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Blaine).
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. . . ,,33 After noting
that the Webb-Kenyon Act was of doubtful validity, 34 he claimed that by not
including section two "we are turning the dry States over for protection to a
law. . . which might very well be held unconstitutional upon re-presentation of it. 35 Secondly, we are asking the dry States to rely upon the Congress
36
of the United States to maintain indefinitely the Webb-Kenyon Act."
The debates did not, however, indicate that section two granted unlimited, or even very broad, powers to the states. 37 Importation and transportation of liquor were discussed, but liquor traffic regulations such as taxing,38
pricing or licensing were not mentioned. Both the Congressional debates
and the historical background of the Amendment 39 are indicative of the
popular belief of the legislators that section two of the Twenty-first Amendment was added merely to enable the dry states to prohibit, without
commerce clause restraints, the importation of liquor.

protect themselves against the importation of liquor.

B. The Twenty-first Amendment: Early Judicial Interpretation
State power over importation was interpreted broadly in State Boardof
Equalization v. Youig's Market Co. 40 the first case to examine the scope
of state power under section two of the Amendment. The challenged state
regulation in that case imposed a license fee for imported beer, a direct
burden on interstate commerce that the Court acknowledged would have
been unconstitutional prior to the Amendment. 4 1 Justice Brandeis, writing
for the Court, rejected the argument that section two granted power only to
those states that prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicants within
their borders. He stated that the words of the section granted the power to
forbid all importations that did not comply with conditions prescribed by the
state. Although the statute reviewed in Young was not imposed by a dry
state in an attempt to enforce prohibition, the Court construed the Twentyfirst Amendment as giving the states power to adopt regulations short of
complete prohibition. The plaintiffs pointed out that the Amendment's
legislative history supported limiting the Amendment's scope to protection
33. 76 CONG. REC. 4170 (1933). Borah referred to Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), in
which the Court had employed the original package doctrine to limit state power to regulate
imported liquor. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
34. 76 CONG. REC. 4174 (1933). Senator Borah mentioned that the Webb-Kenyon Act had
been passed over a veto by President Taft, who considered the law to be unconstitutional.
35. Id.at 4170. Senator Borah's comment may have stemmed from the facts that in Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917), Justice Holmes and Justice Van
Devanter had dissented and that later interpretations had also divided the Court.
36. 76 CONG. REC. 4170 (1933).
37. See 55 YALE L.J., supra note 20, at 816.
38. See generally 76 CONG. REC. 4138 (1933) (United States Senate) and 76 CONG. REc.
4508 (1933) (House of Representatives).

39. See generally notes 17-26 and accompanying text supra, which describe the struggle of
the dry states to enforce prohibition within their borders.
40. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
41. Id.at 62.
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only of the dry states. The Court, however, would not discuss the Congressional debate over section two and refused to consider prior decisions
concerning the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, stating that "[a]s we think
the language of the Amendment is clear, we do not discuss these matters. "42
The Court limited its holding to the question of commerce clause
restraints on import regulations, summarily dismissing an equal protection
argument 43 by declaring that "[a] classification recognized by the Twentyfirst Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth."44 The
Court acknowledged that the Amendment enabled the states to regulate
imported liquor in the same manner as domestic liquor, but it did not render
an opinion as to the effect of4 5the Amendment on other constitutional
restrictions on the police power.
Much of the academic criticism levelled at the Young Court's interpretation of state power under the Amendment was aimed at its refusal to
examine the Amendment's legislative history. 46 The next few cases, however, reiterated Young's grant of broad state rights in the area of importation, regardless of whether the state was "wet" or 'dry." 47 In doing
so, these early cases expanded the scope of state power beyond that originally conceived by the drafters of the Amendment, who sought only to
protect the so-called "dry" states. 48 Since Young had established precedent
for examining the Amendment only on its face,4 9 the interpretation of the
Amendment as reflected in its legislative history was all but forgotten.
Instead, the first cases to follow Young adhered to a literal reading of
section two, establishing a solid recognition of wide state power to control
the importation of liquor into any state, free from both commerce clause
42. Id. at 63-64.
43. The plaintiffs argued that the classification of imported beer as opposed to the unlicensed, untaxed domestic beer constituted a denial of equal protection. Id. at 64.
44. Id.
45. Id. The Court declared that the "question for decision requires no such generalization." Id.
46. See generally 55 YALE L.J., supra note 20; 7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 402 (1939); 85 U.
PENN. L. REV. 322 (1937).

47. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938), construing Young as
allowing a state to discriminate against imported liquors even if the discrimination "is not an
incident of reasonable regulation of the liquor traffic.
... Id. at 403. See also Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939), in which the Court invoked the
Twenty-first Amendment to sanction a "retaliatory" statute prohibiting importation of intoxicants into Indiana only from those states that taxed or licensed Indiana liquor. But see Collins

v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1937), one early case that defined a limit to the Amendment's scope. The case was a suit to enjoin enforcement of California's Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act within the limits of Yosemite National Park. The Court held that in geographic
areas in which the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction, the Twenty-first Amendment
was inapplicable; thus, the states are without power to regulate alcoholic beverages in federal
enclaves.

48. See generally notes 31-39 and accompanying text supra.
49. Justice Brandeis reiterated this point in Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395
(1938).
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restraints and the guarantees of the equal protection clause. The Court in the
future was left with the task of defining and setting limits on state power
under the Amendment as problems arose in different contexts.
C. Later Cases: Narrowing the Amendment's Scope
A few years after deciding the Young case, the Court indicated that the
Twenty-first Amendment did not confer unrestricted power on the states to
control liquor traffic within their borders. Although language in the opinions
still remained absolute in regard to state power to regulate the importation of
liquor, the Court began to recognize that outside the area of importation the
state laws were still subject to some constitutional restraints.
One of the first cases to suggest that the states' power was not unlimited under the Amendment was Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves,50 which indicated that
there were both commerce clause and equal protection limitations on the
Amendment's scope. The state law at issue in Ziffrin required transporters
or carriers to obtain licenses before they could legally export any alcoholic
beverages. In upholding the provisions, the Court did not rely on the
Twenty-first Amendment to protect the state law, noting that the Amendment merely sanctions the right of a state to legislate unrestricted by the
commerce clause with respect to liquor "brought from without.' ' 51 The
Court also addressed the issue of the extent of state power to regulate liquor
outside the area of importation, the question upon which the Young Court
had declined comment. The Ziffrin Court considered the state's power to
regulate the manufacture, sale, transportation or possession-of intoxicants to
be based upon the police power, under which the state may adopt "measures
reasonably appropriate to effectuate [the restrictions] ....
"52 Therefore,
in areas outside of importation, state laws were subject to a reasonableness
requirement.
In its treatment of the equal protection challenge, the Court indicated
that aside from those laws that regulated the importation of alcoholic
beverages, state liquor laws must still conform to the demands of the equal
protection clause. 53 Although the Court stated that it could not find any
discrimination in the state provisions, it did not say, as it previously had
done, that a Fourteenth Amendment argument could not be entertained.
In United States v. FrankfortDistilleries,-Inc.,4 the Court's holding
implied that even the commerce clause limited the protection to be given
state liquor regulations under section two of the Twenty-first Amendment.
Frankfort considered an antitrust prosecution of wholesalers, producers and
retailers of alcoholic beverages charged with coercive price-fixing activities
50. 308 U.S. 132 (1939).

51. Id. at 138.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 140.
54. 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
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in violation of the Sherman Act. The indictment alleged that the parties
agreed to fix and maintain a single course of conduct in making contracts of
sale and to boycott all others who would not adopt the same course. The
indicted parties argued, in part, that the Twenty-first Amendment gave the
states exclusive power to control liquor traffic, thereby rendering the Sherman Act inapplicable, but the Court affirmed that the Amendment had not
granted states plenary and exclusive power to control interstate liquor
55
trade.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, recognized that under the
Amendment the states had broad regulatory power over liquor traffic within
their boundaries. 56 He noted, however, that it did not follow that the United
States had absolutely no power to regulate the in-state conduct of persons
engaged in interstate liquor trade. 57 Thus, the Court intimated that even with
regard to liquor traffic, the federal
government had power to control conduct
58
covered by the Sherman Act.
In 1964, the Supreme Court formulated a new approach for defining
the extent to which the scope of state power under the Amendment was
limited by the commerce clause. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp.59 concerned a retail liquor business located at John F. Kennedy
Airport in New York City. The retailer purchased the liquor outside of New
York state under the supervision of the Federal Bureau of Customs, and
transported it into the state to the airport, where it was sold to departing
55. Id. at 299.
56. Id.

57. Id.
58. It must be noted, however, that the suggestion in Frankfort that federal authority is
not always subordinate to the Twenty-first Amendment was merely dictum. The Sherman Act

was not applied to defeat the policy of the state because state law did not authorize the
defendants' activities; therefore, the case did not involve a conflict between federal and state
authority. As a result, the Court did not decide whether state or federal authority prevailed in

governing conduct which affected interstate liquor traffic in violation of the Sherman Act. See
55 YALE L.J., supra note 20, at 816-17, which suggests that the Court may have been showing

preference for a new standard for determining the scope of the Amendment; see also Comment,
Concept of State Power Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REv. 465, 479 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 40 TENN. L. REV. 465]. But see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Frankfort, in which he discusses the issue upon which Black reserved comment. Frankfurter
viewed the Sherman Act as subordinate to the Twenty-first Amendment and, as such, violated
only when the conduct in question is not sanctioned by state law. 324 U.S. at 300-02 (Frankfur-

ter, J. concurring).
Nevertheless, the cases that followed Frankfort supported and expanded Justice Black's

acknowledgement of limits to the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment. Although the Court
did not always hold the state liquor statutes invalid, most decisions revealed a closer examination of the nature and effect of the regulations. For example, in Groesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.

464 (1948), the Court employed the Twenty-first Amendment to uphold a Michigan statute
restricting employment of female bartenders. The Court found a reasonable legislative basis
and held the state law to be valid. Id. at 467. See also Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S.
416, 425 n.15 (1946).
59. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
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international passengers. The New York State Liquor Authority attempted
to terminate Idlewild's commercial operations, claiming that the business
violated a state law requiring retail liquor outlets to have a street level
entrance on a public throughfare. 6° The Court acknowledged that if the
commodity in question was not liquor, the commerce clause would deprive
New York of the power to terminate the operation. Thus, the Court faced the
issue it had declined to address in the past-how the Court should analyze a
conflict between section two of the Twenty-first Amendment and other
provisions of the Constitution, "particularly the Commerce Clause.' 61
Justice Stewart, writing for the. majority, briefly reviewed the early
Twenty-first Amendment cases and concluded that the states were "totally
unconfined by traditional Commerce Clause limitations when [they restrict]
the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consumption
within its borders." 62 He warned, however, that
[t]o draw a conclusion from this line of decisions that the Twentyfirst Amendment has somehow operated to "repeal" the
Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is
concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If
the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto "repealed," then
Congress would be left with no regulatory power over interstate or
foreign commerce in intoxicating liquor. Such a conclusionwould
be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect. 6
Following this strong statement, the Court departed from its prior
Twenty-first Amendment analysis by describing the accommodation analysis that it would use to examine conflicts between federal law and state
regulations for the control of liquor traffic. Justice Stewart declared that
since both the Twenty-first Amendment and the commerce clause were parts
of the same Constitution, each must be "considered in the light of the other,
and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case. "64
Distinguishing Idlewild from earlier decisions in which the state law had
prevailed, Justice Stewart observed that the immediate case did not involve
a state regulation aimed at preventing unlawful diversion or use of alcoholic
beverages within the state. Rather, the state was attempting to terminate
transactions conducted in accordance with a law passed by Congress under
an explicit constitutional power. 65
The Court concluded that New York had
66
no constitutional right to do so.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

N.Y. ALCO. Bay. CoNr. LAW § 105(2) (McKinney 1970).
377 U.S. at 325.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 332.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.3. The commerce clause gives Congress the power to

regulate commerce with foreign nations. See note 18 supra.
66. Justice Black wrote a strong dissent criticizing the majority for establishing such
inroads on state power. He focused on the older cases such as Young, voicing approval of the
broad and comprehensive power that those decisions had granted the states for control of liquor
traffic. Justice Black also interpreted the legislative history of the Amendment as giving the
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The immediate effect of Idlewild on future decisions was unclear
because the Court's mode of analysis had been broadly stated. Justice
Stewart had admitted that the states could regulate liquor unconfined by the
"traditional" limitations of the commerce clause, but he did not define what
those "traditional" restraints were. He had also formulated an accommodation, or balancing, test without outlining the situations in which the test
should be employed. For example, in his discussion of prior cases, he
focused on the fact that they involved importation of liquor for use within
the state. He did not, however, state that the test should be implemented
when the regulations being questioned do not entail importation for use
within the state's borders; nor did he explain the weight given to the
Constitution's express reservation of power over foreign trade to the federal
government.
Because Idlewild failed to address these issues, interpretations of the
case have varied. 67 The decision can be construed narrowly, reserving
application of the test only to cases in which the federal regulation is enacted
pursuant to explicit constitutional authority and the ultimate use of the liquor
is not within the borders of the state in question. 68 One could also construe
the opinion as establishing a new standard of review for Twenty-first
Amendment cases. 69 Whatever the interpretation, the case illustrated that
the Court could and would impose commerce clause limitations on state
70
power under the Amendment.
The next case to examine the Amendment, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Hostetter,7 1 demonstrated a new approach for dealing with equal
protection arguments in Twenty-first Amendment cases and reiterated that
states absolute power over activity within its borders. He neglected, however, to address any

distinction between the grant of power to "dry" as opposed to "wet" states; nor did he
acknowledge that the Congressional debates emphasized that the states should be given control
of importation of liquor and not an absolute power over all types of liquor regulations. 377 U.S.

at 33440 (Black, J., dissenting).
67. See generally Note, The Evolving Scope of State PowerUnder the Twenty-first Amendment: The 1964 Liquor Cases, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 759 (1965), which describes some of the
interpretations of Idlewild.

68. See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on State Authority to
Control IntoxicatingLiquors, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1578, 1594 (1975).

69. For a favorable reaction to the decision, see 38 TEMP. L. Q. 227 (1965), in which the
author makes reference to the legislative history and purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment.
70. See also Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964), which
supported the view of Idlewild and Young that the Amendment's protection extended only to
commerce clause restrictions. The Beam Court considered the relationship between the
Amendment and the export-import clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
The case involved a Kentucky import tax on liquor imported from outside of the United States
to a bonded warehouse in Kentucky and later distributed in various states across the country. In

the majority opinion, Justice Stewart rejected the contention that the Twenty-first Amendment
invalidated the clause, pointing out that the Court had "never so much as intimated that the
Twenty-first Amendment has operated to permit what the Export-Import clause precisely and
expressly forbids." Id. at 344.
71. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
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state liquor regulations were subject to commerce clause restraints. The
challenged statutes in that case were New York's "affirmation" laws for
liquor. The provisions required brand owners of liquor, or their agents, to
file monthly price schedules for sales to wholesalers and retailers. The laws
further required that the price schedules be accompanied by an affirmation
that the price of the liquor was no higher than the lowest price at which sales
were made anywhere else in the United States during the preceding month.
A group of distillers, wholesalers and importers of distilled spirits sought to
enjoin enforcement of the law claiming, in part, that it violated both the
commerce clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority opinion acknowledged the holding in Idlewild that section two had not repealed the commerce clause, but did not determine
whether the affirmation laws were an unreasonable restraint of interstate
trade. 72 The Court upheld the regulations, declaring that, any harmful effect
on interstate commerce would be largely conjectural 73 since the laws had not
yet gone into effect. 74 It is significant to note, however, that the Court was
only concerned with the constitutionality of the laws on their face. Significantly, the opinion hinted that as relevant data became available, the Court
might be able to decide whether that method of state liquor regulation
constituted so grave an interference with business elsewhere as to make the
regulation invalid under the commerce clause. 75 The Court thus inferred that
did not protect state laws from all commerce clause chalthe Amendment
76
lenges.
The Court's treatment of the equal protection contentions 77 shows a
definite departure from the earlier analysis of statutes enacted pursuant to
the Twenty-first Amendment. The opinion contains none of the sweeping
language of Young and the other early cases that flatly refused to entertain
Fourteenth Amendment arguments. Rather, the Court applied traditional
equal protection analysis without discussion as to whether the Amendment
72. The appellants contended that the provisions placed an illegal burden on interstate
commerce, conflicted with federal antitrust legislation, and thus should yield to the federal

interests by virtue of the supremacy clause. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra for a
brief discussion of the effect of the supremacy clause on state liquor laws enacted pursuant to

the Twenty-first Amendment.
73. Id. at 43.
74. Id. at 41. Justice Stewart explained that as a result of a series of stays throughout the

litigation, the affirmation laws had not gone into effect at the time the opinion was written. Id.
The Court's examination was thus limited to the face of the provisions. Id.
75. Id. at 42-43.
76. Thus, Seagram's treatment of the commerce clause question supports the view in

Idlewild that the Twenty-first Amendment has not barred all federal power under the commerce
clause.

77. The plaintiffs claimed that the provisions arbitrarily discriminated against various
segments of the liquor industry. For example, the laws excepted consumer sales and private
label brands of liquor from the category of products that had to adhere to the affirmation

procedure. Id. at 50.
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would preclude or temper such consideration. 78 The Court declined to
invalidate the provisions on equal protection grounds, declaring that (1) it
could find no invidious discrimination and (2) the legislature appeared to
have had a reasonable basis for79 imposing the affirmation requirement on
sales by retailers to consumers.
There is contradiction within the Seagram opinion,' however. In one
respect, Seagram appears to be tightening the new latitude set by Idlewild
by limiting that holding to its facts. 81 The Court's action, however, belies
this interpretation of its language. The Court recognized the existence of
both equal protection and commerce clause limitations on the Amendment's
scope. For example, as mentioned above, the Twenty-first Amendment was
not invoked to preclude or modify application of the current constitutional
analysis for equal protection challenges as had been done before Idlewild.
As to the commerce clause, Seagram can be viewed as utilizing an even
more accommodating analysis than that employed in Idlewild. The opinion
indicates that even as to intrastate use of alcoholic beverages, it would be
possible to prove a sufficient interference with interstate commerce
so as to
82
render the affirmation laws invalid under the commerce clause.
78. Justice Stewart declined comment on the due process contention that the affirmation
laws imposed an "unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious" burden upon liquor distillers,
wholesalers and retailers. He stated that it was a legislative, not judicial, role to decide the
wisdom and utility of legislation. 384 U.S. at 46-47.
79. Id. at 50-52.
80. See generally Comment, State Power to Regulate Liquor: Section Two of the Twentyfirst Amendment, Reconsidered, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1131 (1973), which interprets Seagram
as stating both that (1) states have wide section two powers; and (2) under Idlewild, the states
do not have wide section two powers. Id. at 1138-39. The author stated that these two
conclusions cannot be reconciled. The Seagram Court distinguished the two concepts, however, by stating that a state has wide section two powers when the importation is for local use,
consumption or distribution, but that when ultimate delivery is in a foreign country, as was the
case in Idlewild, the state's power might be subordinate to that of the federal government. 384
U.S. at 42.
81. As mentioned above, Justice Stewart distinguished Seagram from Idlewild. See text
accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
82. See also 40 TENN. L. REV. 465, supra note 58, at 482-83, which observes that in
Seagram "the idea of 'accommodating' opposing state and federal interests seems to be present
throughout the opinion, especially in the section dealing with the Sherman Act." Id. at 483.
This trend of accommodation between state and federal interests in the control of liquor
traffic continued through the next few years. The cases dealt primarily with conflicts between
state laws and the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433 (1972), the Court noted that the police power of the states over intoxicating liquors
was extremely broad even prior to the Twenty-first Amendment. The Court held, however, that
state liquor regulations must still meet the requirements of procedural due process. The
Wisconsin statute in question forbade the sale or gift of liquor to anyone who, by excessive
drinking, produced described conditions or exhibited specific traits such as exposing himself or
his family to poverty, or becoming dangerous to the peace of the community. At issue was the
statute's requirement that the names of such designated persons be posted with liquor stores
without hearing or notice to those persons.
For an example of the Court's attitude toward equal protection and state liquor laws, see
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1971). Irvis, a black guest of a member of a private
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A temporary break in the use of "accommodation" analysis came in
1972 when the Supreme Court, in California v. LaRue,83 held that the
protection given by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to freedom of
expression must yield to state power under the Twenty-first Amendment.
LaRue concerned a series 0f rules promulgated by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control that denied liquor licenses to premises
hosting entertainment involving certain degrees of nudity and specified
sexually suggestive acts. 84 The district court found the regulations to be
unconstitutional as violative of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.a5 Judge Ferguson, for a three-judge court, observed that since the
Supreme Court had established that the interest of a state in regulating the
liquor business cannot override the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 86 it certainly could not override the First Amendment. 87 Judge
Ferguson further stressed that other clauses in the Constitution may not be
used to determine and restrict obscenity without 8complying
with the obscen8
ity standard established by the Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 89 Justice Rehnquist, delivclub, was refused service at the club's dining room and bar because of his race. He contended
that the racial discrimination was state action because the state liquor authority had issued a
liquor license to the club. The Court held that the state liquor authority violated equal protection when it applied licensing sanctions resulting in the enforcement of racial discrimination.
Thus, the Court implicitly denied the power of the Twenty-first Amendment to shield state
liquor regulations from scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Id. at 175-79.
83. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
84. The following kinds of performances were prohibited by the California Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control rules in question:
(a) The performance of acts, or simulated acts, of "sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts which are
prohibited by law";
(b) The actual or simulated "touching, caressing or fondling on the breast, buttocks,
anus or genitals";
(c) The actual or simulated "displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva or genitals";
(d) The permitting by a licensee of "any person to remain in or upon the licensed
premises who exposes to public view any portion of his or her genitals or anus";
and, by a companion section,
(e) The displaying of films or pictures depicting acts a live performance of which was
prohibited by the regulations quoted above. Rules 143.3 and 143.4.
Id. at 111-12 (citing 4 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 143.3-.4).
85. 326 F. Supp. 348 (1971).
86. Id. at 357. Judge Ferguson was referring to Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971). See note 82 supra for a discussion of the facts in Constantineau.
87. 326 F. Supp. at 357.
88. Id. The court warned that to allow a state agency to "issue, renew or revoke liquor
licenses for the purpose of censoring whatever it believes to be undesirable entertainment"
would be to "allow states to circumvent the protection provided by the First Amendment and
do indirectly that which they cannot do directly." Id.
89. 409 U.S. at 119.28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides for direct appeal to the United States
Supreme Court from a three-judge United States district court decision.
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ering the majority opinion for a divided Court, 9° commented on the content
of the restricted entertainment, but did not base the Court's decision on
obscenity grounds. Noting that the challenged regulations came to the Court
not in the context of censoring a dramatic performance but rather in the
context of licensing bars and nightclubs to sell liquor by the drink, 91
Justice Rehnquist based his holding on a broad interpretation of state power
under section two of the Twenty-first Amendment. Justice Rehnquist
viewed the Amendment as conferring "something more than the normal
state authority" over public health, welfare and morals. 2 He recognized
that no decisions had gone so far as to hold that the Amendment superseded
all other provisions of the Constitution, but he intimated that the type of
entertainment in question was not protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the same extent that more classical modes of entertainment
were protected. 93 Declaring that the performances consisted "more of gross
sexuality than of communication," 9 4 the Court thus held that the provisions
were constitutional, given the "added presumption in favor of the validity
. . . that the Twenty-first Amendment requires [in this area] . . . ."
The LaRue decision was the subject of much criticism 96 and is of
questionable value as precedent for the expansion of state power under
section two. 97 There are several grounds on which the Court's reasoning can
90. LaRue was a 6-3 decision. Dissenting opinions were filed by Douglas, J., 409 U.S. at
120, Brennan, J., id., at 123, and Marshall, J., id.
91. 409 U.S. at 114.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 118. Justice Rehnquist referred to the restricted entertainment as "bacchanalian
revelries" that are not the "constitutional equivalent of a scantily clad ballet troupe in a
theater." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 118-19.
96. See generally Kamenshine, California v. LaRue: The Twenty-First Amendment as a
PreferredPower, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1035 (1973). See also Note, The FirstAmendment Onstage,
53 B.U. L. REV. 1121 (1973); Note, Californiav. LaRue: The Demise of the "Bottomless"Bar,
I PEPPERDINE L. REV. 129 (1973); Comment, State PowertoRegulate Liquor: Section Two of the
Twenty-first Amendment, Reconsidered, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1131 (1973); Note, The Expansion of State Power Through the Twenty-first Amendment, 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 509 (1973);
Comment, Demon Rum and the Dirty Dance:Reconsidering GovernmentRegulation of Live Sex
EntertainmentAfter California v. LaRue, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 161; 61 GEo. L.J. 1577 (1973); 19
VILL. L. REV. 177 (1973). Cf. Note, Californiav. LaRue: The Supreme Court's View of Wine,
Women, and the First Amendment, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 130 (1973) (author states that LaRue
seemingly did not expand scope of Twenty-first Amendment, id. at 133; majority opinion in
LaRue said to clarify First Amendment doctrine, id. at 160).
97. The LaRue decision, however, appears to be good law at least on its facts. Recently,
the United States Supreme Court denied review of a federal district court's refusal to enjoin the
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control for suspending a bar owner's license for
violation of the provisions challenged in LaRue. The Court decided that in view of its determination in LaRue that the nude entertainment regulations are facially constitutional, the trial
court had properly refused to convene a three-judge court to review the bar owner's constitutional challenge. Richter v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 559 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1978).
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be questioned. First, Justice Rehnquist appears to have made an inadequate
study of legislative action prior to the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment. Such a study would have demonstrated that his expansion of state
power went far beyond the original purpose of the Amendment, which, as
mentioned above, 98 was to ensure that states desiring prohibition would be
able to control the importation
and transportation of alcoholic beverages in
99
accordance with state laws.
Even if the purpose of the Amendment was not so strictly construed,
however, another criticism of LaRue is that the Court failed to distinguish
the immediate case from the Court's prior decisions interpreting the Amendment. For example, Justice Rehnquist cited Seagram and Idlewild as a basis
for the opinion's recognition of a broad sweep of state power under the
Amendment," ° even though the commerce clause had been a primary
ground for the challenges in both of those cases. LaRue, in contrast,
concerned activities that allegedly were entitled to First Amendment protection. Yet Justice Rehnquist made no comparisons with the Court's analysis
in other cases involving individual rights, such as Wisconsin v. Constantineau,11' in which the Court employed an analysis more accommodating to
individual interests than that used in LaRue to determine state power under
the Amendment. Even in Twenty-first Amendment cases that had dealt
directly with the economic control of liquor, the Court had made a closer
examination of the challenged provisions 0 2 than it did in LaRue, despite the
fact that LaRue involved the First Amendment.
Another area of uncertainty in the Court's analysis is its treatment of
the accommodation approach used in Idlewild. The Court quotes Idlewild's
accommodation language, 10 3 but sheds no further light on the questions of
when and how the test is to be employed. Although the Court recognized
that state regulation in "the area covered by the Twenty-first Amendment is
undoubtedly strengthened by that enactment,"0 4 the extent of this
"strengthening" was not delineated; nor did the Court discuss whether the
California statutes were "in the area covered by" the Amendment.
Due to these uncertainties and incongruities in the majority opinion, the
98. See notes 31-39 and accompanying text supra.

99. Compare the analysis in the dissent by Justice Marshall, in which he stated:
But the Amendment by its terms speaks only to state control of the importation of
alcohol and its legislative history makes it clear that it was intended only to permit

'dry' States to control flow of liquor across their boundaires depite potential

Commerice Clause objections. . . .There is not a word in that history which indicates that Congress meant to tamper in any way with First Amendment rights.
409 U.S. at 134 (original emphasis).
100. Id. at 115-16.
101. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). See note 82 supra.
102. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966); Hostetter

v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Department of Revenue v. James
Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
103. 409 U.S. at 115 (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S.

324, 332 (1964)).
104. Id.
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holding in LaRue should carry little weight in defining the scope of the
Twenty-first Amendment. In light of the constitutional protection accorded
First Amendment rights at the time of the decision,10 5 the LaRue Court
expanded the scope of section two to an extent unsupported by the legislative history and judicial interpretation of the Amendment. 106 As noted in one
of the three dissenting opinions: "Nothing in the language or history of the
Twenty-first Amendment authorizes the States to use their liquor licensing
power as a means for the deliberate
inhibition of protected, even if distaste1
ful, forms of expression." 07
The latest Supreme Court case to interpret the Twenty-first Amendment, Craig v. Boren,10 clarified Twenty-first Amendment analysis in two
respects: (1) the opinion establishes that statutes enacted pursuant to the
Amendment are not free from judicial scrutiny under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'09 and (2) dictum in the decision
indicates that LaRue is to be limited to its facts.110 The issue in Boren was
whether a state statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating"
3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18
constituted discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age equal
protection of the law. Justice Brennan, delivering the opinion of the Court,
concluded that the operation of the Twenty-first
Amendment did not alter
1 11
the application of equal protection standards.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court made a distinction between state
liquor laws affecting the normal operation of the commerce clause and those
105. But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), decided four
years later, in which the Court narrowed the extent of First Amendment protection in a manner
similar to that used by Justice Rehnquist in LaRue. In Young, the Court examined the

constitutionality of a local ordinance that required "adult theatres" to be licensed and subjected to zoning ordinances. "Adult theatre" was defined as one which presented material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to

"Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas." Id. at 53. In a 5-4 decision,
the Court stated that "even though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the
total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that
society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate . . . . Even though the First
Amendment protects . . . [communication such as "Specified Sexual Activities"] . . .from

total suppression, we hold that the state may legitimately use the content of these materials as
the basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures." Id. at 70-71.
See generally Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Levels of Protected
Speech, 4 HASTINGS CONSn. L.Q. 321 (1977).
106. See generally notes 31-39 and accompanying text supra (legislatie history); notes 40-

49 and accompanying text supra (early judicial interpretation).
107. 409 U.S. at 123 (Brennan, J., dissenting).,See also Justice Marshall's dissent, 409 U.S.
at 123-39, in which he states that the Twenty-first Amendment analysis is "'relevant only to the

extent that California has in fact encroached upon First Amendment rights." Id. at 136.
108. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

109. Id. at 204-05.
110. Id. at 207.
111. Id. at 209-10.
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that allegedly resulted in violation of equal protection guarantees. 1 12 Justice
Brennan intimated that the accommodation test is limited to cases in which
the state regulations conflict with the commerce clause.113 He also noted that
since the adoption of the Amendment, the Court's decisions have confirmed
that the Amendment "primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause" 114 but that even in commerce clause
conflicts, the Twenty-first Amendment required that the state and federal
provisions be viewed in light of the respective interests at stake. 115 He
further noted that the Court had in the past upheld state regulations that
pertained to the importation of alcoholic beverages, 116 indicating that provisions touching on this area "where the State's authority under the Twentyfirst Amendment is transparently clear" 117 would be more likely to prevail
in a state-federal balancing analysis of a commerce clause conflict.
With reference to the equal protection claim, the Court first noted that
the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to constitutional provisions
other than the commerce clause was "increasingly doubtful." 118 The Court
then distinguished the early Twenty-first Amendment cases, which had
generally involved importation of intoxicants, from Boren, which concerned individual rights.11 9 The Court construed LaRue narrowly by observing
that in that case the activities for which First and Fourteenth Amendment
protection was sought consisted of performances that " 'partake more of
gross sexuality than of communication'.... "120 The Court then declared
that it had "never recognized sufficient 'strength' in the Amendment to
defeat an otherwise established claim of invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 121 Justice Brennan applied the current
equal protection standard for review of classifications based on gender and
concluded that the classifications were invalid, 122 thus demonstrating the
narrow application that the Court had given to LaRue's interpretation of the
relationship between the equal protection clause and the Twenty-first
112. Id. at 206-07.
113. Id. at 206.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at207.
118. Id. at 206. Justice Brennan quoted P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING, CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (1975), inwhich the author remarked that" '[n]either

the text nor the history of the Twenty-first Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual
rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment where the sale or use of
liquor is concerned.'" 429 U.S. at 206.
119. 429 U.S. at 206-07.
120. Id.at 207 (quoting California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1973)) (citation omitted).
121. Id. Justice Brennan cited Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), as
establishing that state liquor regulatory schemes cannot work invidious discrimination violative
of equal protection. 429 U.S. at 208.
122. Id. at 197-204. The Court required that the gender-based classification be substantially
related to achievement of the statutory objective. Id. at 197.
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Amendment. In so doing, the Court also affirmed its approach in Seagram,
in which the Twenty-first123Amendment had not hindered the operation of the
equal protection clause.
The California Supreme Court has accepted the concept that the scope
of the Amendment does not offer state liquor laws protection from equal
protection analysis and, in dictum, has voiced approval of the accommodation test as the means by which to resolve commerce clause issues. In
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 124 an unanimous court held unconstitutional a
state statute that prohibited women from tending bar except in specified
circumstances. 125 Justice Peters for the court rejected the argument that the
Twenty-first Amendment protected the state law from constitutional attack. 126 In response to the equal protection claim, Justice Peters declared
that the power of the state to regulate alcoholic beverages is "necessarily
subject" to the demands of the equal protection clause.' 2 7 The court then
ascertained and applied the proper equal 128
protection standard to be used in
scrutinizing gender-based classifications.
Dictum in the opinion also recognized commerce clause restraints on
the Amendment's scope. Justice Peters acknowledged that although the
"early cases painted state powers under section 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment with a broad brush, later decisions have taken a position more
in keeping with the original intent of the amendment." 129 After emphasizing
that the Amendment gave the states the right to regulate or prohibit the
importation of alcoholic beverages, 13 0 the court noted the accommodation
language of Idlewild, concluding "it is apparent that the Twenty-first
Amendment not only does not reach all alcoholic beverage cases which
would otherwisefall within Congress' commerce clausepowers, but even in
those situations covered by the express language of the amendment, some
balancing and accommodation must take place." 13 1 Thus, the California
court, like the Court in Boren, considered an accommodation analysis to be
the appropriate way to resolve conflicts between state liquor laws and the
commerce clause.
In deciding the conflict between California's price maintenance laws
for liquor and the Sherman Antitrust Act, the California Court of Appeal in
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board132 should not have
upheld the state laws under the Twenty-first Amendment without an exami123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25656 (West 1964) (amended 1967; repealed 1971).
5 Cal. 3d at 11-13, 485 P.2d at 535-36, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
Id. at 16, 485 P.2d at 538, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
Id. at 16-22, 485 P.2d at 538-43, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 338-43.
Id. at 12, 485 P.2d at 535, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
Id.
Id. at 12, 485 P.2d at 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (emphasis added).
137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1977).
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nation of the competing state and federal interests. The early cases interpreting commerce clause limits on state power under the Amendment granted
wide power in the areas of importation and transportation, thereby adhering
to a literal reading of section two. 133 Outside of those areas, however, the
Court's analysis of conflicts between the commerce clause and state liquor
laws has developed into an "accommodation" approach that weighs the
state and federal concerns involved. Through the Sail'erInn decision, the
California Supreme Court demonstrated its approval of this accommodation
test for resolving conflicts between state liquor regulations and the
commerce clause. The court stated that even in a situation expressly covered
by the Amendment, some balancing must take place. 134 Because California's minimum retail price maintenance laws for liquor are neither the type
that the Amendment was enacted to protect nor within the literal confines of
the Amendment's language, the accommodation test is the proper mode of
constitutional analysis for resolving the commerce clause issue in Rice. Part
II of this note will therefore examine both the commerce clause and then the
equal protection limitations on the scope of state power under the Twentyfirst Amendment, focusing on the effect that these limitations have on the
Rice case.
H.

Limitations on State Power Under the Twenty-first Amendment:
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board

A. Commerce Clause Limitations: An Accommodation Test
This section of the note will discuss the commerce clause limitations on
California's power to enact retail price maintenance laws for liquor pursuant
to the Twenty-first Amendment. The note first outlines the purposes of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, moving from the general goals of the Act and the
development of a federal policy against price fixing to a discussion of the
Act's treatment of resale price maintenance. A brief discussion of fair trade
laws begins with a description of Congress' exemptions to the Sherman Act
for state-established fair trade laws and their subsequent repeals. Having
thus established the conflict between the Sherman Act and California's
liquor price program, the note proceeds to examine the question of whether
the California program, being a state regulation, warrants a common law
"state action" exemption13 5 to the Sherman Act. After determining that the
state laws are not eligible for such an immunity, the note defines the criteria
for the Supreme Court's Twenty-first Amendment accommodation test.
Finally, this criteria is applied to California's liquor pricing laws.
133. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
134. 5 Cal. 3d at 12, 485 P.2d at 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 336; see text accompanying note 131
supra.
135. See note 14 supra for an explanation of the distinction between the term "state

action" as familiarly used in antitrust law and the "state action" doctrine which pertains to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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1. The Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 in response to both a growing
public concern about monopolies in American business and a general distrust of corporations.1 36 The law was not aimed at maintaining a perfectly
competitive economy, however, for Congress and the economists alike
realized that unlimited competition was not desirable and that there were
37
situations in which a monopoly could be beneficial to the public interest. 1
Thus, the Act was aimed at only unreasonable restraints of trade "tested by
the rules of common law and human experience." 138 The general policy
behind the Sherman Act was succinctly
stated by the Court in Northern
139
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same
time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that
premise qpen to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by
the Act is competition. And to this end it prohibits "Every
contract, combination.

. .

or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or

14
commerce among the several States."' 0

Early Sherman Act cases established that it was an unlawful restraint of
trade for manufacturers to require distributors, by agreement, to adhere to
the manufacturer's prescribed retail prices; resale price maintenance (RPM)
was considered to be destructive of competition, injurious to the public
interest, and therefore illegal per se. 14 1 By the early 1930's, however,
movements to enact legislation that would legalize RPM began to achieve
some success on the state level. In 1931, California passed the first so-called
"fair trade" law to legalize RPM contracts. 142 Two years later, in response
to manufacturers' complaints as to the burden of establishing separate
contracts with each retailer, California's Fair Trade Act was amended by the
addition of a "non-signer" provision. 143 This clause provided that as long as
136. W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY INAMERICA 54-70 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
LETWlN]. This book provides an historical treatment of the Sherman Act. See also H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955).

137. LETWIN, supra note 136, at 95-99.
138. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
139. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
140. Id. at 4-5.
141. Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum resale price maintenance
illegal per se); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(minimum resale price maintenance is a per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act).
142. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16902 (West 1964) (repealed 1975).
143. Id. § 16904 (West 1964) (repealed 1975).
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a manufacturer had entered into an RPM contract with one of his retailers, it
was illegal for any other retailer knowingly to sell below the price that that
contract stipulated.
In 1936, the Court upheld state fair trade laws in the face of challenges
based on the United States Constitution.' 44 Congress passed the MillerTydings Act145 in 1937 to exempt from the Sherman Act any minimum
resale price agreements that were sanctioned by state law and that involved
interstate commerce. Several years later, the Court held that the MillerTydings Act did not legalize non-signer provisions; 146 subsequently,
Congress passed the McGuire Act, 147 which provided that under state laws,
manufacturers could set resale prices-not necessarily minimum prices8
and that the price restrictions could be imposed against non-signers."4
Even after the passage of the McGuire Act, fair trade continued to be a
controversial issue in Congress. In 1975, after a series of Congressional
debates, Congress repealed both the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts,
thereby rendering unlawful those RPM arrangements within the reach of the
Sherman Act.' 49 This most recent legislative action, the Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 1975, appeared to affect fair trade laws for all consumer
goods. There is, however, a statement in the legislative history of the Act
that appears to remove liquor from its reach. The Senate Report declares that
"while repeal of the fair trade laws generally will prohibit manufacturers
from enforcing resale prices, alcohol manufacturers may do such in States
which pass price fixing statutes pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment." 150 In Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,i5 1 the
court seemed to treat this language in the Senate Report as exempting the
California liquor laws from fair trade repeals. 152 The Supreme Court, however, has established that it will strictly construe any exemptions to the
antitrust laws, requiring specific and clear indication of Congress' intent.1 5 3
144. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).

145. Act of August 17, 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693, (repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975)).
146. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
147. Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631, (1970) (repealed by Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975)).
148. The McGuire Act was upheld by the Court in Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
149. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
Justifications for the Act as stated in its legislative history included a belief that the laws result
in higher consumer prices and that they permit retailers to have identical prices, thus eliminating price competition. See S. REP. No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975). Repeal of the fair
trade laws had been called for by President Ford, consumer groups, the Justice Department, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Council on Wage and Price Control, discount stores and
smaller business associations. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 2.
151.
152.

137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1977).
Id. at 218.

153.

In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Court was asked
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The Senate Report, therefore, did not constitute an exemption to the Sherman Act, as it did not clearly establish that state liquor laws were immune; it
merely noted that repeal of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts would not
affect the RPM laws for liquor in the same way that other products would be
affected. The mention of the Twdnty-first Amendment indicates recognition
that state RPM laws for liquor are to be treated differently from those for
other products due to the constitutional support afforded by section two of
the Amendment; that is, a conflict between the Sherman Act and a state
liquor law enacted pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment will not result
in the Sherman Act automatically prevailing under the supremacy clause.
Rather, the constitutionality of RPM laws for alcoholic beverages should be
analyzed by means of the accommodation test that the Court has developed
for examining the competing state and federal interests involved. Before
discussing the accommodation test, however, it must be determined whether
the California liquor laws are immune from the Sherman Act due to a
common law exemption that applies to certain types of state regulatory
schemes. The next subsection of the note addresses this additional Sherman
Act issue.
2. The "State Action" Antitrust Law Exemption
The threshold question in the Rice court's discussion of the California
liquor pricing program and its conflict with the Sherman Act was whether
the program, being part of a state regulatory scheme, was at all subject to the
federal antitrust laws. The court of appeal held that due to the program's
state regulatory function, the laws fell within a common law exemption and
15 4
were therefore not subject to the Sherman Act.
This so-called "state action" doctrine was first suggested in Olsen v.
Smith155 and later developed in the landmark case of Parker v. Brown,l56
to determine whether bank mergers were exempt from § 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 335-55.
Stating that "[i]t is settled law that '[i]mmunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied,'"
the Court emphasized that this "canon of construction" reflected "the felt indispensible [sic]
role of antitrust policy in the maintenance of a free economy.

... 374 U.S. at 348 (citations

omitted). The Court intimated that if Congress wanted to exempt an industry from a law, the
legislative history must contain evidence that Congress wished to confer a special dispensation
upon that industry. Id. In Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951),
the Court refused to read into the Miller-Tydings Act an antitrust exemption for non-signer
provisions. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stressed that the words of the statute must
contain an express exemption before the Court would allow an immunity, "The omission of the
nonsignor provision from the Federal law is fatal to respondents' position unless we are to
perform a distinct legislative function by reading into the Act a provision that was meticulously
omitted from it." Id. at 388. See Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, in u hich he submits that
"it does not appear that there is either necessity or propriety in going back of [the Act] into
legislative history . . ." as resort to legislative history is only justified " here the face of the
Act is inescapably ambiguous ....
Id. at 395.
154. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
155.
156.

195 U.S. 332 (1904).
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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upon which the Rice court based its decision on the issue. The Parker case
involved the California Agricultural Prorate Act, which authorized through
the action of state officials the establishment of programs for the marketing
of California raisins so as to restrict competition among growers. A program
committee composed of ten raisin producers was required to formulate a
marketing program that in turn had to be approved by the California
Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission, which also had authority to
modify the program. After approval, the marketing program would be
administered by the producers, subject to approval by the State Director of
Agriculture.
A producer and packer of raisins challenged the marketing program
adopted for the 1940 raisin crop as being in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. After assuming that the prorate program would indeed violate
the Sherman Act, the United States Supreme Court held that the Act did not
render the program unlawful since, in view of the Sherman Act's words and
history, it must be taken to be a prohibition of individual and not state
action. 157 In holding that "state actions" were immune from the antitrust
laws, the Parker Court based its reasoning on the fact that the challenged
program was part of state-created "machinery," which required adoption
and enforcement by the state and which had to be approved by a state
commission. 158 The Court's analysis also mentioned that the state program
59 The Court
had been adopted in accordance with an express federal policy. 1
did not, however, indicate what weight this was in fact given in this case. 160
Subsequent to Parker, some courts established that when a state regulatory program involves private conduct, those actions require sufficient
supervision and accountability to the state before the conduct is excused
157. Id. at 352.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 368. The Court declared that "whatever effect the operation of the California
program may have on interstate commerce, it is one which it has been the policy of Congress to
Id.
I..."
aid and encourage through federal agencies .
160. The Court later established that merely because a state enforced a pricing program, it
did not necessarily follow that the program was exempt from the Sherman Act. In Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), the Court invalidated a state law allowing
non-signer provisions. Noting that private manufacturers were enforcing fixed prices against
retailers with whom they had made no contractual agreements, the Court held that the price
fixing activity did not fall within the exemption that the Miller-Tydings Act had established for
RPM contracts. Without an express exemption from Congress, state compulsion of private
price fixing was not exempt from federal antitrust laws; the Court observed that "when a state
compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the
Sherman Act forbids." Id. at 389. Accord, Wainwright v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 304 F.
Supp. 567, 574-75 (N.D. Ga. 1969). One commentator distinguished Schwegmann from Parker
by noting that in Parker, the statute in question was not inconsistent with federal policy, as the
state program had been adopted with the aid and approval of the federal government. The
author concluded that when the state policy truly conflicts with federal law and policy, the
Court may be more willing to hold the state-compelled conduct illegal as it did in Schwegmann.
Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulaton, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRusT L.J. 950, 960-61 (1970).
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from antitrust law restraints under the "state action" exemption.1 6 1 For
example, in Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade v. FTC,162 the state's
involvement consisted of authorizing local tobacco boards of trade to make
reasonable regulations for the marketing of tobacco. The boards were made
up entirely of private tobacco businesspersons who were not accountable to
the state for the rules and regulations they designed. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that the state authorization of the board's activity
did not exempt the board's actions from being held subject to the Federal
Trade Commission's provisions forbidding unreasonable and undue restraints on trade. 163 The court declared that the state may for public policy
reasons regulate an industry to eliminate competition and may even permit
persons subject to such controls to participate in the regulations, provided
their activities are "adequately supervised by independent state offi164
cials. "'
Noting that the officers and members of the tobacco board were
not accountable to the state and were not supervised in any manner by state
officials, the court held that the regulations and activities of 1the
board did
65
not warrant a state action exemption to the FTC prohibitions.
In examining state action that encompasses private conduct, the courts
have continued to emphasize the state's role as a supervisor by requiring an
independent administrative review and approval of prices before granting an
exemption to the antitrust laws. For example, the court in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Lanier 66 applied the exemption to insurance companies that set
uniform minimum rates for their industry. In holding the state action
exemption applicable, the court focused on the state's dominant and independent'role in the rate program; before the set rates could be charged to the
public, they had to be reviewed and approved by the State Insurance
Commissioner, who 167
was also authorized to approve upward deviations from
the prescribed rates.
161.

See generally Note, StateActon Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 50 B.U. L. REV.

393, 400-05 (1970).
162. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).

163. Id. at 510. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. 1975).
164. 263 F.2d at 509. Accord, Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
165. 263 F.2d at 510.
166. 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966).
167. Id. at 872. See also Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062, rehearingdenied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972) (exemption applied when
utility rates were subjected to meaningful regulation and supervision by the state); Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) (exemption applied
where state regulatory body investigated and reviewed conduct of utility company with respect
to rates, tolls and charges); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (1stCir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (Parkerexemption did not apply merely
because private contractor's specifications were adopted by public school board); Macom
Prods. Corp. v. A.T. & T., 359 F. Supp. 973, 976-77 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (state supervision must be
more than general to invoke Parker immunity; challenged conduct must be the result of the
considered judgment of a state regulatory authority).
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A later case, Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 161 involved a challenge by an independent liquor retailer that the Virgin Islands'
resale price maintenance program violated the Sherman Act. This pricing
law required producers, importers or wholesalers to file the wholesale price
of their liquor, and brand owners or their licensees to file minimum retail
prices for their products. The Fourth Circuit decided that the program
violated the Sherman Act1 69 and rejected the argument that the mandatory
price provisions were immune from the antitrust laws under the state action
doctrine of Parker.170 The court construed Parkeras having emphasized the
extensive government involvement; in Parker, government officials rather
than private individuals determined at what price the raisins would be sold.
The court went on to declare that the exemption did not apply in the instant
case since under Virgin Islands law, the territory's board had "no power to
approve, disapprove, or modify the prices fixed by private persons." 17 1 In
so holding, the court distinguished "genuine governmental action controlling 'the anticompetitive practice, and an attempt by government officials to
'authorize individuals to perform acts which violate the antitrust laws.' "172
The holding in Norman's is especially relevant to Rice v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Board 73 in that both of the cases involved
minimum retail price maintenance programs. Judged against the criteria set
out by the Norman's court, the California liquor scheme should not be
granted a state action exemption. Under the California system, the liquor
distillers are the parties setting the resale price levels. The state's role is that
of an enforcer as opposed to a supervisor or reviewer. The state does not
approve or modify the prices set by the private parties, nor does it offer
guidelines for the distillers to follow in establishing such prices. This
complete lack of administrative review would, under the holding in Norman's, have rendered the California pricing program subject to the federal
antitrust laws.
In its decision that the common law exemption applied in Rice,
however, the California Court of Appeal relied on the 1975 Supreme Court
decision in Goldfarb v. VirginiaState Bar.1 74 That case concerned an attack
on a minimum fee schedule for common legal services published by the
county bar association, a state agency. The schedule was enforced by the
Virginia State Bar, through which the Virginia Supreme Court regulates the
practice of law in that state; a state bar opinion stated that evidence that an
attorney habitually charged less than the suggested fees raised a presumption
168. 444 F.2d 1011 (3rd Cir. 1971).

169. Id.at 1016.
170. Id. at 1018.

171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir.

1959)).
173. 137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1977).
174. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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of professional misconduct. 17 5 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
stated that the "threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive
activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to
proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign."I76 The Court declared that it did not need to inquire further into
the state action question because the state did not compel the anticompetitive
activities. Justice Burger emphasized that Virginia had not enacted a statute
referring to attorney fees, nor did the state supreme court's ethical codes
direct the bar associations to supply fee schedules or to require any type of
price floor. 177 Chief Justice Burger also noted the absence of any evidence
that the Virginia Supreme Court had ever approved the state bar opinions
urging adherence to the schedules. 178 Such "prompting" of anticompetitive
activity by the state bar, Burger held, was not enough to warrant application
of the common law exemption. 179
The Goldfarb opinion treated as a threshold inquiry the question of
whether the state actually compelled the challenged conduct. Since the
conduct in question was not compelled by the state, the Court expressly
withheld judgment as to further requirements for the state action exemption. 180 The California Court of Appeal in Rice interpreted Goldfarb as
stating that this threshold question is dispositive of the issue of the exemption's applicability; therefore, if the activity was compelled by the state, the
"state action" inquiry comes to an end.181 The Court's lengthy review of
the Parker doctrine in the 1976 case of Cantor v. DetroitEdison Co. ,182
however, casts doubt upon the Rice court's interpretation of Goldfarb. In
Cantor, the owner of a drugstore selling electric lightbulbs brought an
antitrust action against an electric private utility company, alleging that the
utility company had restrained competition and damaged his business by
distributing free lightbulbs to residential subscribers in exchange for their
burned-out bulbs. The electrical utility could not abandon the program
without the approval of the Michigan Public Service Commission and
therefore claimed that the state's participation rendered the utility immune to
the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion that the
public utility's participation in the program was sufficiently significant to
require that its conduct be subject to the Sherman Act.
As to the "threshold" language in Goldfarb, the CantorCourt empha175. Id. at 777-78.
176. Id. at 790.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 791.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 790.
181. 137 Cal. Rptr. 213, 217-18 (1977).
182. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall joined. Chief Justice Burger joined in the opinion with
the exception of Parts II and IV (holding that Parker v. Brown did not control since the
defendant was a private utility company). Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented.
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sized that "[c]ertainly that careful use of language could not have been read
as a guarantee that compliance with any state requirement would automatically confer federal antitrust immunity" 183 Satisfaction of the inquiry
concerning state compulsion is thus not sufficient to sustain an ultimate
determination that the exemption applies. When there is conjunctive state
and private involvement, the nature and extent of each party's role must be
examined before the state action question is finally resolved.iS4
In the most recent Supreme Court case to discuss the Parkerdoctrine,
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,185 the Court reaffirmed the concept that
examination of the nature of the private parties' and state's roles in the
challenged activity is the focal point of state action antitrust analysis. In
Bates, attorney members of a legal clinic challenged an Arizona Supreme
Court rule prohibiting attorneys from advertising, arguing in part that the
disciplinary rule violated sections one and two of the Sherman Act because
of the rule's tendency to limit competition. 186 Writing for the majority,
Justice Blackmun barred the Sherman Act claim after stating that the Parker
exemption applied. 187 In his explanation of the exemption's applicability, he
contrasted Bates with Goldfarb and Cantor, both cases in which the Court
had refused to grant an exemption. Justice Blackmun first distinguished
183. Id. at 600.
184. A puzzling aspect of the Cantor opinion is the Court's focus on the question of
whether the "state action" doctrine applies to private parties who have allegedly violated the
Sherman Act. The opinion distinguished Cantorfrom Parkerby noting that in the former, suit
had been brought against a private party; in the latter, the state officials overseeing the program
had been the parties sued. Id. at 589-92. The Court determined that the Parkerdoctrine did not
control in Cantor because the instant case did not "call into question the legality of any act of
the State of Michigan or any of its officials or agents ... " Id. at 591-92. However, despite its
holding that Parker did not apply, when the Court outlined the criteria for determining if a
private party's activities should be afforded Sherman Act immunity, it considered factors that
varied little from the approach used in the Parkerline of cases-a focus on which party played
the more dominant role in the alledged state action and whether the regulatory scheme conflicted with federal antitrust policy. Id. at 593-96. Thus, in light of the Court's actual approach in
determining applicability of an exemption, the significance of the Court's distinction between
Cantorand Parker is not clear.
The possible difference in the treatment to be afforded private and state defendants has
also puzzled the commentators, who have recognized that Cantor, in particular, is susceptible
to varied interpretations. See generally Dorman, State Action Immunity: A Problem Under
Cantorv. DetroitEdison, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 503-41 (1977), in which the author views
Cantor as defining criteria for determining whether a private defendant who allegedly acted
under immunity of the state warrants an antitrust immunity. Another commentator sees the
Court as using two different tests for determining state action: in one, the identity of the party is
determinative and the exemption applies to acts of the state and its officials; in the other,
adopted by Parker,the activity is the focus of attention, regardless of the actor's identity. 5
HoFsrRA L. REV. 673-97 (1977); See 60 MARQ. L. REV. 952 (1977); 62 CORNELL L. REV. 628
(1977).
185. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
186. Id. at 2695. The other charge made by the legal clinic attorneys was that the advertising rule infringed upon their First Amendment rights. Id.
187. Id. at 2698.
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Goldfarb, noting that in Goldfarb the anticompetitive conduct was not
required by the state of Virginia. In Bates, however, the advertising prohibition was " 'compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.' "188
Therefore, the advertising restraint satisfied Goldfarb's "threshold inquiry." The Bates Court, however, did not end its inquiry there, confirming
that compulsion by the state is not a dispositive finding for ascertaining
whether the state action exemption applies.
The Court continued its examination by contrasting Bates with issues
raised in Cantor. Justice Blackmun declared that Cantorwould have been
an entirely different case if the claim had been filed against a public official
or agency rather than against a private party. 18 9 He viewed Cantor as an
attempt merely to delineate prerequisites for exemptions in actions against
private parties. 190 The criteria employed by the CantorCourt, however, was
similar to some of the criteria that the Bates Court seemed to limit to
antitrust actions against states and their agents-a focus on the extent of the
participation of the parties involved in the state regulated action and the
nature of the state's interest in enforcing the program. Thus, as a matter of
practical application, it is not clear whether a distinction between different
defendants would alter the result of the Court's state action determination. 191
After this somewhat confusing discussion of private and state parties,
Justice Blackmun compared the fact situations in Bates and Cantor, explaining why the activity in Bates warranted a state action immunity from
the Sherman Act while the conduct by the utility company in Cantor did
not. Justice Blackmun first noted that the CantorCourt had emphasized that
the state did not have an independent regulatory interest in the lightbulb
market; in Bates, on the other hand, the state had clearly expressed its
policy with regard to professional behavior. 192 He also noted that the
lightbulb program had operated with only the acquiesence of the state
regulatory commission. 193 In contrast, the anti-advertising rules in Bates
were subject to "pointed re-examination" by the Arizona Supreme
Court. 194

The Bates decision affirms that the Court considers more than the
"compulsion" factor when determining whether the state action exemption
applies. Before granting the exemption, the Bates Court emphasized that
the case involved (1) action compelled by the state as sovereign, (2) an
express state interest in the regulated activity, and (3) continued supervision
or review by the state. The last criterion is in accord with prior state action
cases that examined conjunctive action between the state and private parties
188. Id. at 2697 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).

189. Id.
190. Id.at 2697-98.
191. See generally note 184 supra.
192. Id.

193. Id.at 2698.
194. Id.
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regulating business activities. As mentioned above,19 5 in such situations the
courts have required an independent administrative review before granting
immunity from the Sherman Act. It is not dispositive of the exemption's
applicability that a state compels the activity; 196 nor is it enough that a state
enforces such a program. 197 Additionally, the courts consider whether the
state action198is in accordance with any express federal policy, as was the case
in Parker.
Application of these concepts to the facts in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board 99 results in a finding that California's
minimum retail price maintenance, laws for liquor do not warrant a state
action exemption. The structure of California's program satisfies only two
of the Bates criteria; the state does compel the anticompetitive conduct and
the California legislature has expressly articulated its interests in maintaining the liquor pricing program. 20 But the third part of the Bates analysis is
not met in Rice because there is no independent state review of the liquor
prices set by the distillers each month. Although the State of California or its
agencies have established the retail price maintenance laws, the prices are
set by private individuals-the liquor distillers who stand to gain much
profit from fixing price levels. There is no review by the state, 1nor are there
20
any suggested standards or guidelines for setting the prices.
Apart from the Bates criteria, there is an additional reason for concluding that the common law exemption does not apply in Rice-there is an
articulated federal policy against resale price maintenance. As mentioned
above, the Supreme Court has determined RPM to be a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. 20 2 This federal policy consideration is reinforced by the
fact that Congress had once granted an antitrust exemption to state fair trade
laws but repealed it in 1975, stating a federal concern about such "legalized
price-fixing. " 201 This clear federal interest casts even more doubt on the
state's grounds for being granted a state action immunity. In light of the
express federal policy against RPM and the fact that the California liquor
distillers set mandatory minimum prices without state review, the state's
pricing program is not entitled to the common law state action exemption to
the Sherman Act.
195. See notes 182-86 and accompanying text supra.

196. Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3rd Cir. 1971). See
notes 181-88 and accompanying text supra.
197. Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). See note 160
supra. See also notes 162-65 and accompanying text supra.
198. See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
199. 137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1977).

200. See note 201 and accompanying text infra. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 24749 (West
1964) expressly declares that it is a state policy to regulate and control sales of alcoholic
beverages in order to promote temperance and the orderly sale and distribution of liquor.
201. For a discussion of the harm from this complete lack of standards, see Comment, Fair
Trade of Liquor in California:Is Barteringfor Booze Bad? 6 CAL. W. L. REv. 282 (1970).
202. See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
203. S. REP. No. 466, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1975).
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As the California minimum retail price laws for liquor are not immune
from the antitrust laws, the Court of Appeal in Rice should have analyzed
the laws by means of the Supreme Court's accommodation test for Twentyfirst Amendment cases. The next subsection of this note examines the
accommodation test, which the Court has as yet described only in broad
terms, and attempts to further define and clarify the criteria that constitute
the test.
3. Defining Criteriafor the Accommodation Test
The United States and California Supreme Courts have not developed
definite criteria or guidelines for the accommodation test. Moreover, there
has not been one clear method of application; the test has been applied or
described somewhat differently in each case that has cited it. An analysis of
those decisions, however, suggests some considerations for weighing the
interests at issue.
In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. ,2o the first case to
enunciate the test, the Court used broad language in describing the balancing
approach, simply stating that the constitutional provisions must be considered in light of each other in the context of the issues and interests at
stake. 20 5 The federal interest in that case was supervising the transportation
of liquor through New York State for sale to international passengers
departing from John F. Kennedy Airport. Acting through a constitutional
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 206 Congress had delegated to the Federal Bureau of Customs the authority to supervise the
transactions in question. The state's interest was enforcement of the New
York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, which dictated certain requirements
concerning the structure of facilities selling intoxicating liquors. 2°7 In
concluding that the federal interest prevailed, the Court focused on two
facts: (1) the state regulation was not within the literal language of the
Twenty-first Amendment because the regulation did not restrict the importation or transportation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution or
consumption within the state's borders, and (2) Congress had exercised an
explicit constitutional power under the commerce clause in authorizing the
Federal Bureau of Customs to control foreign commerce. 208 Aside from
those observations, the Court did not define or discuss what it considered to
be the "interests at stake"; nor did it discuss the relative importance of the
criteria upon which it based its decision.
204. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).

205. Id. at 332. See generally notes 59-70 and accompanying text supra.
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power.
Commerce with foreign Nations .

...

"

207. N.Y. ALCO. Bv. CoNT. LAw § 105(2) (McInney 1970).
208. 377 U.S. at 333-34.

.

. To regulate
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Craig v. Boren,2°9 the latest Supreme Court case to mention the
accommodation test, did so only in dictum. Since the state law had been
challenged on equal protection grounds, an area that the Twenty-first
Amendment has no power to invade, 2 10 the Court merely discussed the
accommodation test as it reviewed the Amendment's judicial and legislative
history. Within that discussion, however, the Court shed some light on what
factors the Court considers in its balancing approach. In his survey of the
Amendment's history, Justice Brennan observed that two states had successfully relied upon the Twenty-first Amendment in response to commerce
clause challenges of state authority to regulate the importation and manufacture of alcoholic beverages. 211 In explaining the results in those cases,
Justice Brennan noted that the states' authority under the Twenty-first
Amendment to regulate transportation and importation of liquor is "transparently clear." 212 The Court thereby reaffirmed the view that a state law
has a greater chance of being upheld when it falls within the literal language
of section two of the Amendment.
The California Supreme Court, in Sail'erlnn,Inc. v. Kirby,213 emphasized that an important consideration in the accommodation analysis was the
question of whether the state statute was of the type expressly protected by
section two. In the process of ruling on the constitutionality of a state law
restricting the employment of women as bartenders, the court briefly surveyed the legislative and judicial development of the Twenty-first Amendment. 214 Noting the link between section two and the wording of the WebbKenyon Act, Justice Peters' majority opinion stated that the Amendment
applied only to prohibition of importation and transportation of liquor into
the state, 215 but that "even in those situations covered by the express
language of [section two], some balancing and accommodation must take
place.' '216 This discussion of the test in Sail'erInn varied little from the
Boren and Idlewild analyses. Although the decision added no new criteria
for balancing the federal and state interests, it did reemphasize the importance of narrowing the Amendment's protection to those statutes within the
core of the Amendment's express grant of power.
Even though these Twenty-first Amendment cases leave few distinct
guidelines for application of the accommodation test, it must be reiterated
that the Idlewild Court used broad language to describe the test, thereby
leaving room for future interpretation and development in the context of
209. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
210. See discussion at notes 118-23 and accompanying text supra.

211. 429 U.S. at 206-07. The Court cited Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401
(1938), and State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
212. 429 U.S. at 207.

213. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
214. Id. at 11-13, 485 P.2d at 535-36, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.

215. Id. at 12-13, 485 P.2d at 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
216. Id. at 12, 485 P.2d at 536, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
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varied fact situations. It should also be noted that in Boren and Sail'erInn,
the state provisions had not been challenged on commerce clause grounds;
therefore, the accommodation test was only discussed generally and in
dicta. In both cases, the state laws had been attacked as denying equal
protection of the law. Because there was judicial precedent for holding that
the power of a state to regulate alcoholic beverages is necessarily subject to
the demands of the equal protection clause, 2 17 the respective courts did not
have to engage in the accommodation test's balancing analysis between
conflicting state and federal laws.
The courts are still in the process of defining the accommodation
approach; moreover, the criteria and methods of application employed or
discussed thus far are not exclusive due to the flexible nature of the test.
Hence, in ascertaining the appropriate method of accommodation to apply in
the Rice case, it is helpful to examine situations in which the Court has
balanced federal commerce clause interests against state regulations not
based on the Twenty-first Amendment; As mentioned above, 2 18 the Twentyfirst Amendment cases involve a unique situation in that the state regulations
that conflict with federal laws do not automatically fall under supremacy
clause analysis; the closest analogy to the state liquor law and Sherman Act
conflict would then be those cases that involve state regulations that burden
interstate commerce within an area in which Congress has either remained
silent or enacted federal regulations that do not preempt the state provision.
Again, the state-federal balancing processes employed by the Court in those
situations must be examined with the awareness that the Twenty-first
Amendment adds weight to the state laws if these laws deal with transporta219
tion or importation.
Generally, the Supreme Court has focused more closely on the state
rather than the federal interests when examining state regulations in light of
the federal commerce clause power. 220 The nature of the state laws and the
217. The Sail'erInn court cited as precedent Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
35, 50 (1966), and Parks v. Allen, 426 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1970). The Boren Court cited
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972).
218. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.

219. Cf. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (rehearingdenied, 410 U.S. 948 (1973))
(Court stated that Twenty-first Amendment added strength to state's power to control liquor,
but did not limit this added strength to regulations involving transportation and importation).
220. See generally Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Illinois statute
required use of certain type of mudguard on trucks and trailers operated on the highways of that

state; held: heavy burden of state law on interstate movement of trucks and trailers passed the
permissible limits even for safety regulations); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951) (city ordinance made it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized unless it had been
processed and bottled at an approved plant within a radius of five miles from the city; held:
local provision placed a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce; provision not essential
for the protection of local health interests); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325
U.S. 761, (1945) (state law prohibited operation within the state of any train with more than 14
passenger cars or 70 freight cars; held: state safety interest outweighed by national interest in
adequate, economical and efficient interstate railway transportation service).
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extent of their burden on interstate commerce affect the weight to be
accorded to these laws in the balancing analysis. For example, when the sole
purpose of the state regulations is to further local economic interests, the
state provisions have ordinarily been struck down with little, if any, consideration of a balancing analysis. 21 When, however, health and safety or
moral purposes lie behind the enactment of the state provisions, the Court
will employ a balancing test, scrutinizing the practical effects of the state
regulations to ascertain whether there are less restrictive alternatives for
achieving the same end. 222
This latter mode of analysis is the logical way in which to employ the
accommodation test in the Twenty-first Amendment cases because the
controlling legislative intent behind most liquor laws, including those challenged in Rice, is that of protecting the health and morals of the population
from the alleged evils of alcohol. 2 2 3 The balancing approach used by the
Supreme Court in cases involving health and safety purposes includes an
assessment of the extent to which the laws have achieved their stated
objectives 224 and a determination of whether the regulation is essential for
the protection of the local interests. 2 1 Even when the rationality of the
state's law is found to be tenuous, however, the reviewing court must
221. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 530-39 (1949). The Court
indicated in that case that if the state objectives are purely economic, the federal interest would
prevail.
222. In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), the Supreme Court outlined
criteria for balancing local interests and federal commerce clause interests. The case concerned
a municipal ordinance that placed restrictions on the sale of milk within the city of Madison,
Wisconsin. In its investigation of the ordinance's constitutionality, the Court indicated that it is
not enough that the local regulation have a permissible purpose. Rather, the practical effects of
the law must be examined to see whether the discrimination inherent in the statute "can be
justified in view of the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting
them." Id. at 354. Furthermore, no discrimination should be tolerated if "reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available." Id. See
also Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976). Cf. Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (Court upheld ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation
of orders to sell goods unless requested to by the occupants. "When there is a reasonable basis
for legislation to protect the social, as distinguished from the economic, welfare of a community, it is not for this Court because of the Commerce Clause to deny the exercise locally of the
sovereign [state] power . . . ." Id. at 640). Note, however, Chief Justice Vinson's dissent,
joined by Justice Douglas, which urged that the Dean Milk "practical effects" criteria should
have been applied. Id. at 647.
223. The general provisions of California's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act specifically
express an intent to protect the health and morals allegedly resulting from the consumption of
alcohol. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1964).
224. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
225. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951). See also Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), in which the Court intimates that there must be a
direct link between the economic regulation and the attainment of a safety and health purpose.
"mhe evils springing from uncared for cattle must be remedied by measures of repression
more direct and certain than the creation of a parity of prices between New York and other
states." Id. at 524.
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determine whether there are alternative ways to achieve the same purpose
before such a law may be struck down.2 26 An examination of the practical
effects of the state laws is not at odds with Supreme Court case law
concerning the Twenty-first Amendment. Cases interpreting section two
have recognized that the Amendment cannot be employed to protect regulations that are an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce; 227 therefore, a
determination of a state law's reasonableness as part of the accommodation
test would be in accord With prior decisions.
Taking into consideration both the accommodation test, guidelines as
developed thus far by the courts and the Supreme Court's approach to statefederal balancing in commerce clause cases, it is suggested that the approach for balancing the state and federal interests involved in Rice may be
stated as follows: after a determination of the purpose of the state and
federal provisions, the primary focus is on the state regulations. As emphasized in the Twenty-first Amendment cases, weight is given to the state
interest if it is determined that the state law is within the express language of
section two of the Amendment. The practical effects of the state provisions
are then examined to determine whether they provide a reasonable means of
achieving their stated objectives. This part of the analysis includes an
assessment of the state law's success in achieving its expressed objectives as
well as a determination of whether the provisions are essential for the
protection of the local health or safety interests at stake. The next step is to
determine the availability of other reasonable means of achieving the declared local objectives. All of these factors are then taken into consideration
in ascertaining whether, given the strength of the federal interest and the
weight provided to the state law by the Twenty-first Amendment, the state
or federal law prevails.
4. Application of the Test
The first step in balancing the state and federal interests is to identify
the purposes behind the two statutes involved. The objectives of both the
Sherman Act and California's retail price maintenance laws for liquor are
easily ascertained, as they have been expressed in both judicial opinions and
the statutes themselves. The purpose of California's retail price maintenance
program for alcoholic beverages is stated in California Business and Professions Code section 24749, which provides:
226. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 373 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).

227. For example, the Court, in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939), noted that
states may adopt measures "reasonably appropriate" to effectuate prohibition and exercise full
police authority in respect to them. Id. at 138. See also Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), which notes that the Amendment does not empower a
state to act "with total irrationality or invidious discrimination in controlling the distribution
and dispensation of liquor within its borders." Id. at 120.
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It is the declared policy of the State that it is necessary to regulate
and control the manufacture, sale, and distribution of alcoholic
beverages within this State for the purpose of fostering and promoting temperance in their consumption and respect for and
obedience to the law. In order to eliminate price wars which
unduly stimulate the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages
and disrupt the orderly sale and distribution thereof, it is hereby
declared as the policy of this State that the sale of alcoholic
beverages should be subjected to certain restrictions and regulations. The necessity for the enactment of provisions of this chapter is,
228 therefore, declared as a matter of legislative determination.
The pricing scheme's purpose, then, is twofold: (1) to encourage temperance in the consumption of liquor and (2) to promote the orderly distribution
and sale of alcoholic beverages, thereby encouraging adherence to other
alcoholic beverage regulations. 229 The expressed aim of the Sherman Antitrust Act, as noted above, 230 is to promote open and unrestrained competition as the general rule of trade. The Court has declared resale price
maintenance to be an unlawful restraint on interstate commerce in violation
of the Sherman Act.231
After the local and national interests are indentified, the focus turns to
the state laws. The first inquiry is whether the state regulation is within the
literal proscription of section two. As mentioned above, 232 California's
liquor price laws do not fall within the express language of the Amendment
as they are not related to either the importation or transportation of liquor.
Also, price regulation in a "wet" state has not been recognized as a concern
of the Amendment's framers either by legislative historians or the Supreme
Court. Because California's laws are not of the type that the Amendment
was intended to protect, section two adds little if any weight to the state's
233
interest in the course of the accommodation process.
Examination of the practical effects of the state laws is the next phase
in the recommended accommodation analysis. The California Supreme
228. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24749 (West 1964).
229. The California Supreme Court in Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d 349,420 P.2d 735,55 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1966), explained this legislative
purpose by noting that retail price wars may encourage retailers, struggling to withstand the
pressure of ruinous competition, to sell liquor below cost in violation of the state's Fair Trade
Act or to transgress other regulations of retail liquor distribution, notably CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 25600-25667 (West 1964). Examples of the types of regulations in those sections
include limitations on the hours of sale and delivery of liquor, inspection controls, rules
governing the practice of substituting advertised brands of liquor and regulations specifying
areas in which alcoholic beverages may be sold. The Wilke court stated that to the extent that
the price laws eliminate retail price wars, they discourage violations of those regulatory
provisions. 65 Cal. 2d at 362, 420 P.2d at 744, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
230. See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
231. See cases cited note 141 and accompanying text supra.
232. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
233. See notes 211-16 and accompanying text supra.
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Court has never determined the extent to which the liquor price laws actually
succeed in attaining their stated goals of promoting temperance and discouraging disruptive sale and distribution practices. In two previous cases
that have looked at the laws' purposes, Allied Propertiesv. Departmentof
Alcoholic Beverage Control234 and Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control,235 the court upheld the validity of the laws
on the assumption that the elimination of price cutting, bargain sales, and
advertising of low prices at the retail level tends to reduce both excessive
purchases of alcoholic beverages 236 and disorderly marketing practices. 2 7
Statistical data shows these underlying assumptions to be untenable.
A scrutiny of California's liquor price maintenance laws indicates that
the program is not a practical method of promoting temperance through a
reduction in consumption. Statistics as to the per capita consumption of
alcohol in California are one indication that the price maintenance laws are
an ineffective way of furthering temperance. According to a California
budget report for 1973-74, per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages
has steadily increased since 1950,238 giving California one of the highest
levels of per capita consumption in the country. 2 3 9 There has been an
increase in the per capita consumption of four out of five categories of
alcoholic beverages, including a 42% increase in the per capita consumption
of distilled spirits, a 30% increase for beer and a 356% increase for dry
2
wines. 40
This data on per capita consumption of liquor in California indicates
that the success of the provisions in promoting temperance is, at best, quite
doubtful. 241 As pointed out in a comprehensive report on California's
alcohol control policies, "[tihere is little compelling evidence to suggest
that fair trade promotes temperance or contributes in any significant way to
the minimization of the current problem of alcohol abuse." 242 It must be
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

53 Cal. 2d 141, 346 P.2d 737 (1959).
65 Cal. 2d 349, 420 P.2d 735, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1966).
Id. at 360-61, 420 P.2d at 743, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 31; 53 Cal. 2d at 148, 346 P.2d at 741.
Id. at 362, 420 P.2d at 744, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 32; 53 Cal. 2d at 149, 346 P.2d at 741.
Clark & Owsley, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's Alcohol Control

Policies 15 (1974) (unpublished report requested by the California Director of Finance as a
review of the state's role in regulating the alcoholic beverage industry) (information reprinted

from California Governor's Budget, 1973-1974) [hereinafter cited as Reappraisal]. The only
category to show a decrease in per capita consumption was that of sparkling wines, sales of
which underwent a 45% decrease in the years 1950-1972.

239. See Temperance, FairTrade and the ABC, CAL. J., Jan., 1971, at 13, which states that
California is tenth in per capita consumption.
240. Reappraisal, supra note 238, at 15.

241. See generally Dunsford, State Monopoly and Price-Fixingin Retail Liquor Distribution, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 454, 484, in which the author concludes, in part, that anticompetitive
policies sometimes tend to work in opposition to what might seem to be temperance goals.
242. Reappraisal, supra note 238, at 19. See also Bunce, Alcoholic Beverage Consumption,
Prices and Income in California 1952-1975 (June 1976) (unpublished report prepared for the
Office of Alcoholism, State of California) [hereinafter cited as Bunce]. It should be noted,
however, that this latter report was not presented to the Court of Appeal in Rice.
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noted, however, that the above statistical evidence is not conclusive proof of
the liquor program's ineffectiveness. Although the data shows that the laws
do not promote temperance, no study has yet determined what California's
liquor consumption trends would be were the retail price maintenance laws
not in existence. Without such an analysis of the differential impact, it
pricing program, per
cannot be determined whether, in the absence of the
243
capita consumption would have been even higher.
There is also evidence that the retail price maintenance laws are an
ineffective means of achieving their second stated purpose, promotion of
orderly distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages, which prevents undue
pressure on retailers to violate other police power regulations on liquor
traffic. The California Supreme Court has noted that when the economic
existence of small retailers is threatened, they may take illegal shortcuts to
maintain their solvency, to the detriment of both the industry and the
public. 244 To the extent that the retail price maintenance provisions eliminated retail price wars in the liquor industry, the court believed that they also
discouraged disruptive practices by retailers struggling to withstand the
pressures of "ruinous competition.' '245
Recent research demonstrates that the California court was incorrect in
assuming that without minimum retail price maintenance, small independent
retailers would be unable to compete in price wars against larger retail
outlets. 246 Before Congress repealed the state fair trade exemptions in 1975,
it conducted considerable research on the general effects of price cutting on
small retailers. The Congressional research resulted in a finding that an
absence of fair trade laws did not result in economic harm to small businesses; 247 to the contrary, the growth of small businesses was substantially
243. But see 3 THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE INDUSTRY, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 69
(1973). At public hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Laws Relating to Alcoholic
Beverages, testimony described the experience that New Mexico had in 1967 after the state
repealed laws for liquor. During the first year following repeal, per capita consumpsion
increased at a moderate rate. But in 1969, it declined again, and by 1971 per capita consumption
in that state was actually less than it had been in 1967, which was the last year in which retail
prices had been posted.
See Bunce, supra note 242, at 1-2, in which the author discusses variables other than price
that contribute to alcohol consumption levels, including the amount of a person's leisure time
and changes in the beliefs about the effects of alcohol and its causal significance for a person's
behavior.
244. Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d
349, 362 n.9, 420 P.2d 735, 744 n.9, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 32 n.9 (1966) (citing Grand Union Co. v.
Sills, 81 N.J. Super. 65, 194 A.2d 591 (1963)).
245. Id. at 362, 420 P.2d at 744, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
246. Td.
247. "Using Dun and Bradstreet data, the Library of Congress found the 1972 firm failure
in 'fair trade' states which have the nonsigner provision was 35.9 failures per 10,000 firms, in
'fair trade' States without the nonsigner provisions the rate was 32.2 failures per 10,000 firms,

while the failure rate in free trade States averaged 23.3 failures per 10,000 firms..." S. REP.
No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
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higher in "free trade" states than in those states that had fair trade laws. 248
Although this study did not look at liquor retailers specifically, the absence
of resale price maintenance laws apparently would not raise the specter of
undue economic pressures, forcing small businesses to shortcut illegally the
existing regulations for orderly liquor distribution.2 49
The final step in the recommended application of the accommodation
test is to determine the availability of other reasonable means of achieving
the stated local objectives. This note has demonstrated that the court in Rice
5
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board"
could determine that
California's price program is not an effective method of promoting temperance and preventing disruptive conduct by small retailers threatened by
ruinous competitive practices. Before the state regulations are forced to give
way to the federal interests, however, it must be determined whether there
are alternative means of achieving the stated purposes of the provisions, that
is, of preventing undue consumption and promoting orderly marketing
conditions.
In 1967, the California legislature enacted a provision that furnishes an
alternative means of promoting both goals of the retail price maintenance
laws for liquor. Section 24755(g) of the Business and Professions Code
generally provides that no liquor retailer shall sell any distilled spirits below
cost."5 Below cost selling is considered the extreme method of waging a
price war. Elimination of below cost selling, then, would arguably eliminate
248. Id. "Finally, the traditional argument that fair trade protects the 'mom and pop' store
from unfair competition is not borne out by statistics. Between 1956 and 1972 the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade States (including states which repealed 'fair trade' during this
period) is 32 percent higher than the rate in 'fair trade' States." Id.
249. There are additional grounds for attacking the overall reasonableness of these laws,
although such arguments do not go to the statutes' failure to achieve their stated objectives. For
example, evidence before the Rice court demonstrates that the laws pro%ide a great temptation
to effect parallel pricing. Data shows that during the past decade, there has been a steady
decrease in price differentials among competing brands of distilled spirits, sometimes to the
point of no price differences at all. Consider, for example, the pricing activity for Scotch
whiskey. A comparison of the posted prices for fifths of the leading brands of Scotch at fiveyear intervals starting in 1961 shows that the price differential from the least expensive brand to
the most expensive was 70 cents, or more than 10 percent. After fifteen years of liquor fair
trade, the price differential had decreased to a penny, or slightly more than one tenth of one
percent. Petition for Hearing and Application for Temporary Stay Order for Real Parties in
Interest at 16, Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1977).
The possibility of such a result had been recognized in the course of debate on the
congressional repeal of the fair trade exemptions. See generally ProposedRepeals ofthe MillerTydings Act and McGuire Act: Hearings on S. 408 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1975).
It is also significant to note that the laws do not provide any safeguards against excessive
pricing. As has already been discussed above, there is no standard of review or guidelines as to
the level at which the prices are set. See note 201 and accompanying text supra. See generally
Comment, FairTrade of Liquor in California:Is Barteringfor Booze Bad?, 6 CAL. W. L. REV.
282 (1970).
250. 137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1977).
251. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24755(g) (West Supp. 1977).
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the danger of "undue stimulation" of consumption, which the legislature
intended to prevent in enacting the retail price maintenance scheme for
liquor. Section 24755(g) would also serve as a reasonable alternative for
ensuring an orderly liquor trade in which retailers adhere to the other liquor
regulations set out in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. Because of the
protection provided by section 24755(g), the small retailers would not have
to fear anticompetitive pricing activity on the part of large retail outlets. As
long as there is no below cost selling, the volume dealers cannot impose
undue economic pressure on the small retailers to engage in illegal acts that
might result in disorderly distribution of liquor and, consequently, harm to
public health and safety.
Another indication of the reasonableness of section 24755(g) as an
alternative to the state liquor pricing scheme is that the requirement of
proof for a violation of this section is satisfied merely upon a showing of a
below cost sale. In the past, the California Supreme Court has indicated
concern with the difficulties in enforcing prohibitions against below cost
sales and has upheld the liquor price program on the grounds that the liquor
laws offer a more facile means of preventing below cost selling than does
the state's Unfair Business Practices Act. 2 52 The court has stated that
requirements of proof for the Act, which include proof of an intent to injure
competition, are so stringent that the legislature might easily have concluded
that the Act offered little practical aid to independent retailers. 253 Section
24755(g) satisfies the court's concern with the standard of proof of below
cost sales because the section does not have any requirement of intent; only
proof of the sale is required. Thus, it appears that elimination of the pricing
system would not leave the independent retailers without a reasonable
means of protection from anticompetitive, below cost pricing.
After all of the above factors are weighed, it appears that the state laws
must give way to the Sherman Antitrust Act. Although the laws may be
accorded some support by the Twenty-first Amendment, the cases interpreting the accommodation test have indicated that in the course of the balancing process, less weight is given to the state laws if they are not within the
literal language of section two. The California liquor laws are not expressly
covered by section two of the Twenty-first Amendment because they do not
regulate the importation and transportation of liquor. Thus, the Amendment
adds little weight to the state's interest in Rice. Another factor that weighs
against upholding the state interests is that the court could find the laws to be
an ineffective means of decreasing consumption and preventing economic
pressures on small retailers. Statistics reveal that the assumptions upon
which the California Supreme Court has upheld the retail price maintenance
laws are no longer tenable. Additionally, there is an alternative means for
252. Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d
349, 363, 420 P.2d 735,744-45,55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 32-33 (1966). The Unfair Business Practices Act
is found in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1964 & Supp. 1977).
253. 65 Cal. 2d at 363, 420 P.2d at 744-45, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33.
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controlling economic activity in the liquor market, thereby providing for the
health, safety and moral interests involved in the enactment of the state
liquor laws. When the weakly supported state interests are weighed against
the strongly articulated federal policy in favor of promoting competition and
against resale price maintenance, the federal interests should prevail.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Rice court was correct in
upholding the liquor price laws on the basis of state power under the
Twenty-first Amendment, such a conclusion should have been reached only
after the state and federal interests were properly balanced; the accommodation test is the appropriate constitutional analysis for the court to have
employed in resolving the commerce clause issue. The court should have
examined the nature and effectiveness of the state laws and balanced the
interests involved rather than rely as it did on such a broad interpretation of
the Twenty-first Amendment.
B. Equal Protection Limitations on the Twenty-first Amendment
In Rice, the retail price maintenance laws for liquor were also challenged as violating the equal prptection clauses2 4 of both the state and
federal constitutions.25 5 The earliest judicial interpretations of the Twentyfirst Amendment granted the states such broad and comprehensive powers
over importation of alcoholic beverages that the Supreme Court did not even
entertain Fourteenth Amendment arguments against state liquor regulations
in those cases. 25 6 As subsequent interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment's scope imposed more limits on the states' power, however, the Court
has established that section two of the Amendment does not alter the
applicability of equal protection standards to state liquor laws.2 7
The California Supreme Court has never fully addressed the issue of
whether the state's retail liquor pricing program constituted a denial of equal
protection. It has, however, considered the question of whether the provi254. "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." C %L.CONsT. art I, § 11.
"No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked,
or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or
immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." CAL. CONST. art I,
§ 21. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall

make or enforce any law which shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
255. 137 Cal. Rptr. 213, 219-21 (1977).
256. See, e.g., State Board of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936). See
generally notes 40-49 and accompanying text supra.

257. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-204 (1976); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 50 (1966); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,485 P.2d 529,95 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1971); Cf. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (Court unclear as to effect of
equal protection clause on state liquor regulations enacted purusant to Twenty-first Amend-

ment; indication that Amendment offers some protection from Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, id. at 114-18, but no clarification as to what types of laws warrant such protection).
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sions are a constitutional exercise of the police power, in both Allied
Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control5 8 and Wilke &
Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.259 In upholding the constitutionality of the provisions both times, the court found
that they bore a reasonable relationship to the stated purposes of promoting
temperance and bringing about orderly marketing conditions. 260 Three years
after it decided Wilke, the California Supreme Court was again asked to rule
on the validity of the price program. This time, in Samson Market Co. v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 6 1 the court stated that "[it
did] not feel compelled to essay a third review of the issue," 262 because
Wilke and Allied Properties had thoroughly examined the question.
The court of appeal in Rice interpreted California's equal protection
standard as requiring only that the distinction drawn by the statute "bear
some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.''263
Observing that "our Supreme Court has already concluded that the challenged law has a legitimate purpose, and that the means chosen by the
Legislature bear a rational relationship to that purpose,' 264 the court of
appeal concluded that it had no alternative but to accept the prior holdings of
the California Supreme Court on the issue of the constitutionality of the
provisions. The court's reasoning in reaching that conclusion did not,
however, take into consideration the changes that the California equal
protection standard has undergone since Samson Market was decided; nor
did the court take notice of the data currently available that could aid in a
determination of the liquor price maintenance program's rationality. This
last section of the note discusses recent developments in the state's equal
protection standard, first taking note of the trends of federal authority in
equal protection analysis upon which the California criterion is, in part,
based. The note will close with a brief examination of the liquor provisions
in light of the new state standard.
1. FederalEqual Protection Standards
Federal equal protection analysis has undergone significant development in the past few years; it is thus difficult to predict what standard the
Supreme Court will employ in reviewing a given type of statute. 26 Tradi258, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 346 P.2d 737 (1959).
259. 65 Cal. 2d 349, 420 P.2d 735, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1966).
260. Id. at 360-65, 420 P.2d at 742-46,55 Cal. Rptr. at 30-34; 53 Cal. 2d at 146-49, 346 P.2d

at 739-41.
261. 71 Cal. 2d 1215, 459 P.2d 667, 81 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1969).
262. Id. at 1219, 459 P.2d at 669, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 253.

263. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
264. Id. at 220.

265. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:A Model for a.NewerEqual Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as A Newer Equal Protection]. See also Developments in the

Law-EqualProtection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
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tionally, the Court had applied minimum scrutiny, thereby treating state
regulations with deference. 266 Because the Court only looked for some
rational basis for the legislation, most statutes passed the test. By the
1960's, the Court had departed from this mode of analysis by evolving what
was eventually referred to as the two-tiered test. 267 Under that test, those
classifications that were deemed by the Court to be "suspect" 2 68 or to
involve a "fundamental interest" 269 were subjected to strict scrutiny-a
difficult test to pass. Other classifications, including economic and social
welfare regulations, were usually given minimal scrutiny. 270 In the 1970's,
the Court continued to employ the two-tiered test. 271 Some justices of the
Court, however, began to voice dissatisfaction with the dual approach.
Justices Marshall, Powell, White and Stevens suggested a break from the
rigidity of that standard because a single test was not in fact being consistently applied.
Justice Marshall's opinions demonstrated early dissatisfaction with the
272
dual distinction. In a dissenting opinion in Dandridge v. Williams,
Justice Marshall pointed out the need for a middle ground between the two
degrees of scrutiny that the Court had been employing. The Dandridge case
questioned the constitutionality of a $250 per month ceiling on all grants
under the Aid for Families with Dependent Children program, regardless of
266. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (regulation of optician
profession; Court declared that the prohibition of the equal protection clause "goes no further

than the invidious discrimination." Id. at 489); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
336 U.S. 106 (1949) (state regulation of advertising on motor vehicles upheld; Court stated that

if the classification has relation to its purpose, it is immaterial that statute does not completely
eradicate traffic problem at which law is aimed).
267. A Newer Equal Protection, supra note 265, at 8-10.
268. The Court now acknowledges the following classifications as being "suspect": race,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (racial classification valid only if necessary to achieve
some overriding state purpose); national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (statute in question affected only a single ethnic-racial group); alienage, Nyquist v.

Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (state law denied state financial assistance for higher education to
resident aliens unless they affirmed intent to apply for citizenship when eligible); Examining
Bd. of Eg'rs v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (Puerto Rico law barring aliens from
engaging in private practice of engineering violates equal protection).

269. See, e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (residency
requirement impinges on right to travel interstate); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)
(state residency requirement held invalid; discussion of both right to vote and right to travel

interstate).
270. This is often referred to as the "rational basis" test. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961). For a more recent discussion of how the Court continues to treat economic
and social legislation, see Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). See also
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).

271. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (classifications based on alienage
subject to close judicial scrutiny); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (rationality test is
proper standard for examining a wrongful detainer statute; need for decent shelter and the right
to retain peaceful possession of one's home held not to be fundamental interests).

272. 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); accord, id. at 490 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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the size of the family and its actual need. The majority held that in the area
of social welfare, the Court need only find a reasonable basis for the
classification in order to uphold it. 273 In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated
that the case "simply defies easy characterization in terms of one or the
other of these 'tests.' "274 The approach he proposed placed more emphasis
on a balancing of the various interests at stake. He observed that the mere
rationality test has generally been used in cases challenging business regulations. 275 Justice Marshall declared that in the instant case "concentration
must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the
relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state
interests in support of the classification. '276
Justice Marshall has also argued that no one standard has been applied
by the Court. His dissent in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez277 acknowledged that "[a] principled reading of what this Court
has done reveals, that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause." 278 Justice Marshall viewed the variations as depending upon the constitutional and
societal importance of the adversely affected interest. 279 He also viewed as
an important consideration the invidiousness
of the basis upon which the
280
specific classification was designed.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty& Surety Co. ,281 Justice Powell supported
a test that does not make such rigid distinctions as does the two-tiered test.
In his examination of a workman's compensation benefit program that
discriminated against illegitimate children, Justice Powell observed that
different tests had been used by the Court in the past.282 He pointed out,
however, that in all previous cases, there had been the same essential
inquiry: "What legitimate state interest does the classification promote
[and] what28 3 fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?"
In a concurring opinion in Vlandis v. Kline,284 Justice White expressed
273. Id. at 485.
274. Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 520-21.
277. 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (public school financing program based on property taxes in
individual school districts upheld by majority).
278. Id. at 98-99.
279. Id. at 99.
280. Id.
281. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
282. Id. at 172.
283. Id. at 173.
284. 412 U.S. 441, 456 (1973) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (constitutional
challenge of one year durational residency requirement to qualify for lower tuition and fees at

state university rejected).
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agreement with Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio that had described
the equal protection test as involving a "spectrum of standards. "285 Justice
White voiced the criticism that although the Court at times employed the
different degrees of scrutiny of the two-tiered analysis, sometimes the Court
would merely say that a claim was "invidious" and let the matter rest
there. 286 He also stated:
I am uncomfortable with the dichotomy [of the two-tiered test],
for it must now be obvious, or has been all along, that, as the
Court's assessment of the weight and value of the individual
interest escalates, the less likely it is that mere administrative
convenience and avoidance of hearings or investigations will be
sufficient to justify what otherwise would appear to be irrational
discriminations. 7
Justice Stevens stated in a concurring opinion in Craigv. Boren28s that
he was inclined to believe that the two-tiered analysis does not describe a
completely logical method of deciding equal protection claims; rather, it is a
"method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a
single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.' '289 Justice Stevens further stated that this single standard could be identified more easily by a
careful examination of the reasons motivating particular decisions than by
an attempt to use any all-encompassing terms. 29° Stevens decided that the
statute in Boren was unjustified; he seemed to place the gender-based
classification in a category apart from the usual distinctions of the two tiers,
declaring that the statute was "not as obnoxious as some the Court had
condemned, nor as inoffensive as some the Court has accepted." 291
It is not clear in which direction the Court is moving-whether it will
continue with the rigidity of the two-tiered test or whether it will adopt a
middle test that would use a "sliding scale" approach that bases the degree
of scrutiny on the invidiousness of the classification and the importance of
the individual right involved. 292 Some cases decided by the Court make no
mention of the two-tiered test in the course of their equal protection analysis, 293 while other opinions have adhered to the dual distinction. 2 94 In all
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 458.
Id.
Id. at 458-59.
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).

290. Id.
291. Id. (footnotes omitted).
292. See generally Forum:EqualProtectionand the BurgerCourt,2 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q.
645 (1975). It must be noted that the Court has used a "middle test" largely when examining

classifications based on gender. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 10 (1976); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
293. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which examined a classification based on
gender. Chief Justice Burger framed the test as follows: "A classification 'must be reasonable,

not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation .... .
Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
294. A recent case employing a two-tiered approach is Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
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instances, it is important to look closely at the Court's application of the
standard it espouses; while the Court may state that it is using a traditional
test, it may in fact examine the means employed by the statute in a manner
that reflects a closer scrutiny than the traditional method the Court has
employed. 295 Moreover, there appears to be an increasing support for a
standard of review that more296closely examines the means employed by the
state to attain its objectives.
2. A New California Standardfor Out-dated Laws
The California Supreme Court also applies more than one standard of
review in its equal protection analysis. Traditionally, state economic and
social welfare legislation have been reviewed with judicial restraint; the
challenged legislation is presumed constitutional and the court only requires
that the statutory classifications bear "some rational relationship to a
conceivable legitimate state purpose. "297 When reviewing cases involving
''suspect classifications" or those that touch on "fundamental interests,"
the court applies a more stringent test. 298 In such cases, the state bears the
burden of showing that the distinctions drawn are necessary for the furtherance of a compelling government interest. 299 Thus, in many cases, the
California court appears to have adopted the two-tiered analysis.
426 U.S. 794 (1976), which examined a statute involving licensing requirements for scrap
processors. Note, however, that although minimal scrutiny was employed, the case involved an
economic regulation, which generally still warrants use of the traditional rationality test by the
United States Supreme Court. Here, the Court merely looked to see if the underlying assumptions of the regulation were rational. Id. at 813-14.
295. For example, in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973), after stating that the traditional equal protection standard applied, the Court applied a
closer scrutiny. The case examined a challenge to a section of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7
U.S.C. §§ 2001-2026 (1976) (amended 1977), that generally excluded from participation in the
food stamp program any household containing an individual unrelated to any other household
member. In its equal protection analysis, the Court looked beyond the program's means, which
the Government maintained were rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of
minimizing fraud in the administration of the food stamp program. Instead of accepting that
basis as rational, the Court focused on the practical effects of the classification. Noting ways in
which people could commit welfare fraud despite the statute, the Court declared the provisions
invalid, stating that the classification "simply does not operate so as rationally to further the
prevention of fraud." Id. at 537.
296. See A Newer Equal Protection,supra note 265, at 43-46 for arguments in support of a
means scrutiny analysis that would give the Court a more active role in reviewing legislation.
297. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784, 471 P.2d 487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 852
(1970). Accord, Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 123,524 P.2d 801,806, 115 Cal. Rptr.
329, 334 (1974) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249,96 Cal. Rtpr.
601, 609 (1971)); Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973).
298. See, e.g., Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849,
138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977); People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55
(1976); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970).
299. See, e.g., D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 17, 520 P.2d 10, 22,
112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 798 (1974).
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The California court has also developed a middle test for reviewing
equal protection cases. This test is embodied in the 1973 decision of Brown
v. Merlo. 3°° In that case, the California Supreme Court opted for an
approach that set a course away from minimum rationality and, instead,
gave closer scrutiny to the relationship between the means and ends of the
statute in question. Brown involved a constitutional attack on the state's
automobile guest statute. 3° 1 The statute distinguished between the rights of
paying and non-paying riders in tort actions. On the one hand, an injured
automobile guest, a passenger who had not paid the driver for the ride, was
denied recovery for the careless driving of the host unless the injury resulted
from the driver's willful misconduct or intoxication. A paying rider, on the
other hand, was only required to prove that the driver was negligent. After a
detailed analysis, Justice Tobriner, writing for an unanimous court,
concluded that the traditional rationales for the statute's classification did
not provide a rational basis for the distinction between paying and nonpaying automobile guests.
At the beginning of his equal protection discussion, Justice Tobriner
seemed to acknowledge an equal protection test with a dual distinction. He
pointed out that strict scrutiny should be utilized only in those cases involv30 2
ing "suspect" classifications or touching on "fundamental interests."
After deciding that the guest statute did not fit into either of those categories,
the court proceeded to depart from the traditional approach of viewing
statutes with.minimal scrutiny. The court embraced a new test that required
a more in-depth examination than that customarily applied in determining a
statute's rationality.30 3 Justice Tobriner stated that the appropriate standard
required that "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike.' "304 The requirement, then, was for a "fair and substantial" relationship, not merely "some" relation.
Justice Tobriner's application of this test emphasized that the statute
must be examined in light of present day information and circumstances.
300.
301.
302.
Priest, 5
303.

8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1971) (amended 1973).
8 Cal. 3d at 862 n.2, 506 P.2d at 216 n.2, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392 n.2 (citing Serrano v.
Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 (1971)).
For a discussion of the similarity between the Brown test and the equal protection

model designed by Gunther in A Newer Equal Protection, supra note 265, see Note, The
California Supreme Court-Torts, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 648 (1974): "[lit appears that the result
reached by the court in Brown can be explained only on the ground of a modified 'rational

basis' test. . . . [The standard finally enunciated in Brown is very similar to the synthesis
worked out in the Gunther model: an old 'rational basis' test given new 'strict scrutiny' teeth
by the requirement that the relation between the statute's classifications and purposes must be
'substantial' as well as 'rational.'" Id. at 657-58.
304. 8 Cal. 3d at 861, 506 P.2d at 216, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 75-76 (1971) (emphasis omitted)).
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This included a survey of the state's objectives as recognized by traditional
justifications advanced in both judicial precedent and academic commentaries. 30 5 One of these justifications, that of encouraging hospitality, was
deemed by the court to be irrational when viewed in light of the current state
of liability insurance coverage. 3°6 Justice Tobriner pointed out that "a
classification which once was rational because of a given set of circumstances may lose its rationality if the relevant factual premise is totally
altered.' '307
The Brown v. Mero 30 8 decision marks a trend away from the court's
traditionally restrained role as a check on the legislative power in the areas
of economic and social welfare. Contrary to the manner in which courts
viewed such legislation in the past, the Brown court decided that those
classifications that are not suspect and do not involve a fundamental right
will not carry a presumption of constitutionality. Rather, the court takes a
closer look at the reasonableness of the means used to further the state
interest. The Brown test, in summary, looks for a fair and substantial
relationship between the classification and the objects of the legislation. 3 °
In so doing, it views the means and practical effects of the statute in terms of
present day conditions rather than upon the assumptions and circumstances
existing at the time of the statute's adoption.
The state supreme court's record after Brown v. Merlo3 10 has been
mixed. Subsequent to Brown, most of the cases reviewing social welfare
statutes or economic regulations showed a restraint that prevented such a
close examination of the means used, preferring to focus on whether the
statutes bear some rational relationship to California's purpose in enacting
the provisions. 3 11 In most of these decisions, however, two or three justices
filed strong dissents, criticizing the majority for failing to employ a closer
scrutiny. 312 An example of the court's adherence to the traditional approach
305. Id. at 864, 506 P.2d at 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394.

306. Id. at 868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
307. Id. at 869, 506 P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 398. The court cited CAL. CIV. CODE §
3510 (West 1964): "[wlhen the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself." 8 Cal. 3d at
868, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397. This emphasis on present day conditions is

significant to Rice since the liquor store owner argued that the liquor price laws can no longer
be considered reasonable.
308. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
309. Apart from the assertion that the purpose of the statute was determined from

rationales traditionally advanced on both academic commentary and judicial precedent, the
Brown court did not explain how it had determined the guest statute's objectives. For an indepth look at the various ways in which legislative purpose may be ascertained, see Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
310. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
311. See generally Adams v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 55, 524 P.2d 375, 115 Cal. Rptr. 247
(1974); Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 516 P.2d 840, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1973);
Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973).
312. In Justice Mosk's dissent in Adams v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 55, 63, 524 P.2d 375,
380, 115 Cal. Rptr. 247, 252 (1974) (joined by Tobriner, J.,and Sullivan, J.), he calls for a
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is Schwalbe v. Jones,313 in which the court examined the validity of that part
of the state's guest statute dealing with injury to, or death of, an owner
riding as a passenger in his own vehicle. 314 After applying the old rationality
test, the court concluded that the statute bore a rational relationship to a
"conceivable legitimate state purpose. "315 In the course of the 5-2 decision
authored by Justice Sullivan, the court admitted that the language in Brown
could be interpreted as departing from the traditional equal protection
standard and as lightening "the burden borne by the assailant under the
traditional test." 3 16 The court warned, however, that to dilute the traditional
standard would result in the substitution
of judicial policy determination for
3 17
established constitutional principle.
Only a few other cases decided after Brown have supported application
of a closer study of classifications that do not involve a "suspect" class or a
"fundamental right." Cossack v. City of Los Angeles,318 decided the year
following Brown, adopted the Brown court's view that a statute's rationality should be measured in terms of current conditions rather than those in
existence or assumed to be in existence at the time the provision was
enacted. The court in Cossack ruled on the validity of a 1939 municipal
ordinance that prohibited pinball machines and other games of chance in
public places or on business premises. The court observed that at the time of
the ordinance's adoption, pinball was a game of chance and therefore
regulated by the ordinance. 319 Then, noting that technology had changed
pinball into a game of skill, the court concluded that the provisions
constituted a denial of equal protection since there was an arbitrary classification concerning which games 32
constituted
games of chance and thereby fell
0
within the terms of the statute.
stricter scrutiny. See also Justice Tobriner's dissent in Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405,
431, 509 P.2d 497, 514, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 698 (1973) and Justice Burkes dissent in Steed v.
Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 126, 524 P.2d 801, 808, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329, 336 (1974) (joined
by Justices Mosk and Tobriner).
313. 16 Cal. 3d 514, 546 P.2d 1033, 128 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1976).
314. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1971). In Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,506 P.2d 212,

106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973), the California Supreme Court had held that the guest statute violated
equal protection insofar as it precluded recovery by a "non-owner guest" against the driver for
injury or death caused by that driver. Schwalbe involved another part of that same statute.
315. 16 Cal. 3d at 517-23, 546 P.2d at 1035-39, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 323-27.
316. Id. at 518 n.2, 546 P.2d at 1035 n.2, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 323 n.2.

317. Id. Justice Tobriner filed a dissent, in which Justice Mosk concurred. Tobriner
defended his position in Brown, claiming that "[the determination of whether a particular
classification is 'arbitrary' or 'reasonable' cannot, of course, be made in the abstract .... "
Id. at 528, 546 P.2d at 1042, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). After a detailed

examination of the law's rationality, he found the provision to be violative of state and federal
equal protection guarantees. Id. at 537, 546 P.2d at 1049, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
318. 11 Cal. 3d 726, 523 P.2d 260, 114 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1974).
319. Id. at 730, 523 P.2d at 263, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
320. Id. at 735, 523 P.2d at 266, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
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A more recent example of a case supporting Brown's equal protection analysis is Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. 321 Borer examined the
distinction between (1) the award of damages under California's wrongful
death statute3 22 for a child's loss of parental consortium resulting from the
tortious killing of the parent and (2) the denial of such damages to a child
whose parent has been merely disabled by tortious injury. Justice Tobriner,
writing for the majority, applied Brown's "fair and substantial relationship" standard without discussing whether the challenged statute created a
suspect classification or impinged upon a a fundamental interest.323 He
found the statute to be rational, but only after a look at the history324 and
practical effects of both the wrongful death and loss of consortium actions. 325 The examination of the practical effects of the two laws included an
inquiry into the availability of alternative methods by which a family unit
can recover compensation for the loss
of parental care and services in the
26
case of the parent's wrongful death.a
In Brown and the few cases that have employed its equal protection
approach, the California court, like the United States Supreme Court,
developed a middle test that studies the practical effects of statutes in the
context of present day issues and interests. But it is not yet clear to what
extent and in what circumstances the court will use this new standard that
manifests a change in the balance of power between the legislature and the
judiciary.
The cases using the Brown test, however, can be distinguished from
the cases decided subsequent to Brown in which the traditional test has been
employed. Thus far, the cases that used the Brown criteria to strike down
statutes have involved laws deemed outdated because of changed circumstances; the economic and social situations and the assumptions in existence
at the time of the statutes' enactment had changed considerably by the time
the provisions were constitutionally challenged. In Brown, the court based
its holding not on the type of interest involved, but on evidence that showed
that the underlying assumptions of the legislature in enacting the provision
were no longer tenable. In Cossack v. City of Los Angeles,3 27 the court
emphasized that changes in technology had altered the rationality of the
municipal business provision under challenge. The latest case to use the
Brown test, Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. ,328 also utilized a scrutiny
that involved a review of the legislative history of the provisions and an
examination of the state laws in the context of present day conditions and
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 377 (West Supp. 1977).
19 Cal. 3d at 451, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
Id. at 451-52, 563 P.2d at 865, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
Id. at 446-49, 563 P.2d at 862-63, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07.
Id. at 452, 563 P.2d at 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
11 Cal. 3d 726, 523 P.2d 260, 114 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1974).
19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
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alternatives. Even though the statutes in Borer were upheld, the court's
analysis included a determination of whether they were rational after being
in existence, in some statutory form, for over one hundred years.
A case purporting to apply the traditional rationality test has also used
the Brown approach of reviewing current data. In D'Amico v. Board of
Medical Examiners,329 decided subsequent to Brown, the court examined
vocational licensing provisions in terms of present day conditions. The case
concerned an equal protection challenge of the Osteopathic Act of 1962330
together with the 1962 Amendment to the Medical Practice Act, 331 which
prevented consideration of osteopaths for licenses to practice as physicians
and surgeons in California. The California Supreme Court stated that the
appropriate standard of review was the conventional rational relationship
test traditionally applied in cases involving occupational licensing; 332 such
laws are presumed constitutional unless the party assailing the provisions
demonstrates the irrationality of the classification.33 3
The court first noted the existence of a conceivable state interest in
maintaining the laws-that of protecting the public "from harm suffered at
the hands of poorly trained or incompetent medical practitioners." 334 Instead of ending the equal protection inquiry there, however, the court
proceeded to determine whether that interest was indeed served by the laws
in question. The court reviewed evidence presented by the plaintiffs that
showed osteopathy to be a complete school of medicine and surgery whose
practitioners successfully engaged in the full range of activities commonly
considered to constitute medical science. Deciding that there was no longer
any reason to question the intrinsic ability or inability of osteopathic training
to produce competent and qualified physicians, the court held the laws
invalid to the extent that they forbade the licensure of graduates of osteopathic colleges as physicians and surgeons regardless of individual qualifications. Thus, although the court'had presumed constitutionality, it gave a
full review to the evidence offered by the plaintiffs to prove that the
underlying assumptions to the laws could not be maintained.
D'Amico and all three of the cases using the Brown test employed a
close examination despite the fact that they considered the type of provision
that had historically warranted minimum scrutiny. Judging from the statutes
struck down in Brown, Cossack and D'Amico, it appears that despite the
absence of a suspect classification or fundamental interest, the court can
apply a strict test and invalidate a statute that is outdated. The next step in
this discussion is to determine whether this stricter standard should be
335
applied in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 3600 to 3600-5 (West 1974) (§ 3600-5 repealed 1977).
Id. § 2310 (West 1974).
11 Cal. 3d at 17, 520 P.2d at 22, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
Id. at 16-17, 520 P.2d at 21-22, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 797-98.
Id. at 22, 520 P.2d at 26, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1977).
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As discussed above,33 6 the assumptions upon which the liquor price
maintenance laws were based over forty years ago, in the post-prohibition
era, have now been challenged by statistical research. The California Supreme Court could find that a closer examination of the state liquor laws is
warranted due to (1) the altered horizontal price activity in California's
liquor market, (2) a new alternative means for eliminating below-cost
selling and (3) the increased availability of studies on temperance and the
state's liquor market. Considering the amount of data indicating that the
provisions are now irrational and contrary to the public interest, Rice seems
to be an appropriate situation in which to use Brown's closer equal protection scrutiny. Therefore, the final subsection of this note will briefly review
California's liquor pricing program in terms of the Brown requirement of a
fair and substantial relationship to the statutes' objectives.
3. A CloserScrutiny: CaliforniaRetailPriceMaintenanceLaws for Liquor
In applying the Brown test, the California Supreme Court must determine whether the state's retail price maintenance program for liquor bears a
"fair and substantial relationship" to its objectives when examined in light
of current market conditions. The court of appeal in Rice intimated that a
demonstration of "changed economic circumstances" could result in a
showing that the provisions were invalid, but concluded that no such change
had been established. 337 In so holding, the court relied on the state supreme
court's prior holdings in Allied Propertiesand Wilke, and seemed to ignore
available data on current conditions in the California liquor market that
would have demonstrated such changed circumstances. If, however, the
court had applied the type of scrutiny outlined in Brown, and had carefully
surveyed this data, it would have seen that in the context of the current
economic environment,
the provisions are not a rational means of achieving
338
the state's purposes.
336. See generally notes 234-49 and accompanying text supra.
337. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 220. The court of appeal pointed out that "[w]hile the Board speaks
of a change in economic circumstances since 1939, when the price maintenance laws took
effect, it cites no change since 1969, when the Supreme Court, in Samson Market, last upheld
the statutes." Id. As has already been demonstrated in this note, at the time of Samson Market,

the comprehensive reports on the California liquor industry that exist now were in large part
unavailable.

338. Writer Rupert Wilkinson observed in his book, The Prevention of DrinkingProblems:
mhe great bulk of the [economic] controls reflect present circumstances much less
than they do those of the past: the evils of the old-time saloon; the fervor of Pro-

hibitionism; and the anxieties of Repeal, when men sought simple checks against a
return of the old abuses.

Since those times the changes have been great. Excessive drinking is still with us,
but its styles and environment have altered greatly. . . . Whatever their original
merits, the vast multitude of rules governing liquor sales do very little today to
promote temperance. In some respects they may well promote the opposite.

R.

WILKINSON, THE PREVENTION OF DRINKING PROBLEMS

52-53 (1970).
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This note has already observed that the courts in Allied Propertiesv.
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control33 9 and Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc.
v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control34° made assumptions
concerning the pricing program's success in promoting temperance that now
appear unfounded. 34 1 The state supreme court has upheld the validity of the
laws partly on the assumption that the elimination of price cutting, bargain
sales and advertising of low prices at the retail level tends to reduce
consumption of liquor. 342 The court, however, did not establish a concrete
basis for this assumption. 343 Today, statistical data demonstrates that in the
past twenty-five years, the per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages
has generally risen instead of decreased. 344 Thus, it appears doubtful that the
pricing program has had any significant effect on the encouragement of
temperance.
The note has also established that the retail price maintenance laws are
an ineffective means of achieving the other stated objective for the lawsthat of promoting the orderly distribution of liquor in order to prevent undue
34 5
pressure on retailers to violate other state laws for the marketing of liquor.
As already mentioned above, recent investigation by the United States
Congress has resulted in the finding that the absence of fair trade laws did
not cause economic harm to small, independent businesses; 346 rather, the
growth of small retailers was significantly higher in those states with free
market systems than in those states that had enacted fair trade regulations 347
In light of these findings by Congress, the fear of undue economic pressure
on small liquor businesses no longer appears to be a valid justification for
maintaining the state's liquor pricing program.
Another indication of a statute's irrationality, as pointed out in Brown
v. Merlo, 4 is the existence of alternative means for offering the protection
339. 5 Cal. 2d 141, 346 P.2d 737 (1959).
340. 65 Cal. 2d 349, 420 P.2d 735, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1966).
341. See generally notes 234-43 and accompanying text supra.

342. Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d
349, 360, 420 P.2d 735, 743, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 31 (1966); Allied Properties v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 141, 148, 347 P.2d 737, 741 (1959).
343. The court based its assumption partly on a New Jersey case in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that in formulating its policy for a retail liquor restriction, "the Legislature
could properly accept 'widely held views as to sound liquor control,' including the 'beliefs that
the consumption of liquor is elastic rather than inelastic, and that price cuttings and their
advertisement, along with comparable practices, are undesirable in the liquor field as tending to
stimulate consumption.... .'"Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 65 Cal. 2d 349, 361, 420 P.2d 735, 743, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 31 (quoting Grand Union
Co. v. Sills, 43 N.J. 390, 204 A.2d 853 (1964)).

344. See notes 238-40 supra.
345.
346.
347.
supra.
348.

See notes 246-49 and accompanying text supra.
See note 247 and accompanying text supra.
See note 248 and accompanying text supra; see also text accompanying note 249
8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).

Winter 1978]

RETAIL PRICE MAINTENANCE

allegedly provided by the statute in question. 349 As discussed above,
California Business and Professions Code section 24755(g) 350 prohibits
below cost sales and thereby provides protection for small liquor businesses
that might otherwise be subjected to anticompetitive price-cutting activities
by volume liquor retailers. 351 The provision can be enforced more easily
than the Unfair Business Practices Act, 352 as it does not require proof of an
intent to injure. Additionally, enforcement of section 24755(g) would not
involve a prohibitive cost to the smaller sellers, since enforcement is
effectuated by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control rather than by
private actions.
When judged under the "fair and substantial relationship" standard of
equal protection, California's minimum retail price laws for alcoholic beverages should be found invalid. The means employed by the state can no
longer be deemed to have a substantial relationship to the statute's objectives of promoting both temperance and orderly marketing conditions for
liquor. The practical effect of the laws is to provide liquor distillers with an
unchecked opportunity to set retail prices for their products-the only
industry to have such an economic advantage. As a result of the liquor price
laws, California liquor consumers are subjected to anticompetitive marketing conditions that differ from marketing conditions for any other product in
the state. Thus, the state's liquor consumers have been denied equal protection under the law. As the laws promote neither of their stated purposes and
afford no economic protection that is unique from other state provisions,
they no longer appear to be a rational method of controlling the state liquor
industry. Therefore, the California Supreme Court should invalidate the
state's minimum retail price maintenance laws for liquor.
Conclusion
California's pricing scheme for liquor may have been reasonable in the
post-prohibition era when the states were experimenting with various
methods of encouraging temperance and were attempting to keep a close
watch on the liquor industry. Today, however, the pricing program appears
to benefit liquor distillers more than it protects California consumers. While
the distillers have complete control over setting retail price levels, the liquor
consumers must pay prices set according to a system violative of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. In Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Board,353 the California Supreme Court should abolish the program under
either of two constitutional theories.
349. See note 249 supra for a discussion of some other indications that the laws are
irrational and harmful to consumers.
350. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24755(g) (West Supp. 1977).
351. See notes 251-53 and accompanying text supra.

352. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1964 & Supp. 1977). See note 252 and
accompanying text supra.
353.

137 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1977).
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The court could find that the state liquor program is not protected from
the Sherman Act by section two of the Twenty-first Amendment. When the
states moved to repeal prohibition through the Twenty-first Amendment,
section two was added to insure protection to those dry states that wanted to
bar importation of liquor. In early cases, the Amendment was construed by
the Court as granting the states wide power to regulate varied aspects of
their liquor industries. In subsequent delineation and limitations on the
Amendment's scope, however, the Court has established that a determination of commerce clause limitations on state liquor regulations now involves
an accommodation between the state and federal interests at stake. As the
California laws do not warrant a common law "state action" exemption to
the Sherman Act, the California court should apply this accommodation test
to weigh the competing state and federal interests involved in the Sherman
Act challenge in Rice. Current data and research show the laws to be an
unnecessary and ineffective means of promoting their stated goals. Because
the state pricing laws are not the type of regulation that the Twenty-first
Amendment was established to protect, and in light of a strongly articulated
federal policy against resale price maintenance, application of the accommodation test results in the determination that the federal law prevails.
The United States Supreme Court has also established that section two
of the Amendment does not affect the application of the equal protection
clause; a state equal protection standard that examines the practical effect
of a state's regulations provides another avenue by which the California
court could abolish the liquor laws. Thus far, the court has used this closer
scrutiny to invalidate laws which, though once deemed rational, are no
longer reasonable due to changed social or economic circumstances. The
new test seems to be the appropriate one to apply in Rice because, as
already mentioned, changed conditions have out-dated California's liquor
price laws. After reviewing the data demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the
price scheme, the court should find that the laws do not bear a substantial
relationship to their objectives.
It is difficult to justify these ineffective laws in the face of a strong
federal concern in promoting and maintaining a free market system.
Whichever mode of review it employs, the California Supreme Court should
invalidate the state liquor industry's outmoded and anticompetitive price
laws. Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board354 provides the
court with an opportunity to do so.
354. Id.

